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Abstract
In this paper we will show that certain networks called ‘inhibition nets’ may be regarded as
cognitive agents drawing nonmonotonic inferences. It will be proven that the system CL (introduced
by KLM in [Artificial Intelligence 44 (1990) 186–189]) of nonmonotonic logic is both sound and
complete with respect to the inferences drawn by finite hierarchical inhibition nets. The latter class
of inhibition nets is shown to correspond to the class of finite, normal, hierarchical logic programs
concerning dynamics, and also to the class of binary, layered, input-driven artificial neural networks.
 2001 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
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This paper deals with a class of networks called ‘inhibition nets’. Inhibition nets are
special cases of artificial neural networks, but they have a simpler net-like structure than the
nets usually studied. Inhibition nets are also formal analogues of the biological networks in
the brain, however on a level of abstraction that is higher than the level of the well-known
connectionist machines. However, we will see that every artificial neural net of a certain
kind may be simulated by an inhibition net. The main structural characteristic of inhibition
nets is that there are not only excitatory connections between nodes but also inhibitory
connections between nodes and excitatory connections. We will view inhibition nets as
cognitive agents in a way that contents of belief are not assigned to the activities of single
nodes but rather to patterns of activity, i.e., we employ distributed representation. The
state transitions, which lead from an initial activity pattern to a final stable pattern, will be
regarded as nonmonotonic inferences from an initial total belief to a final (plausible) belief.
What this means exactly will be explained later on. The nonmonotonicity of the inferences
drawn by inhibition nets is due to the effect of inhibitory connections.
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We hope our investigations to be relevant
(i) for nonmonotonic reasoning, since it is proven that a network with properties
similar to those of a logic program is able to reason cumulatively,
(ii) for epistemic logic, since metalinguistic expressions for beliefs, total beliefs and
dispositions of inferential behaviour are introduced, which are satisfied by net-like
agents without a detour to possible worlds semantics,
(iii) for the study of the relationship between the symbolic computation and the
dynamical systems paradigm, since the state transitions in inhibition nets may be
described correctly and completely on the cognitive level by symbolic terms,
(iv) for the study of neural networks, since neural nets of a certain kind are also shown
to reason cumulatively, and
(v) for cognitive psychology since the results of this paper might contribute to our
understanding of how we are able to draw plausible commonsense inferences
(although we have to admit that the agents we consider are highly idealized beings).
Here is the plan of the paper: in the first section we recall some relevant background
information concerning networks and nonmonotonic reasoning. In the second section
inhibition nets are defined and a basic lemma on their topology is derived. The third
section demonstrates that inhibition nets may be regarded as certain dynamical systems
with convenient properties. The fourth section is devoted to the interpretation of these
dynamical systems as cognitive agents which have beliefs and which draw inferences. In
the fifth section the main results are presented and proven, i.e.,
(i) a soundness result stating that the inferences drawn by finite hierarchical inhibition
nets obey the rules of CL, and
(ii) a completeness result stating that for every agent which is disposed to draw
inferences obeying these rules there is a finite hierarchical inhibition net which
is disposed to draw precisely the same inferences.
The sixth section deals with the relationship between inhibition nets and other
nonmonotonic reasoning mechanisms, particularly logic programs employing negation as
failure. The seventh section relates inhibition nets to more usual kinds of artificial neural
networks. In the last section some implications of our results are discussed. Appendix A
summarizes the system CL and restates briefly the necessary logical definitions; Appendix
B does the same for the essentials of logic programming.
1. Background
Throughout the paper we will partially employ the terminology of dynamical systems
theory and of connectionism, and we will introduce abstract surrogates of some of
the concepts used in these fields. At the same time the networks we consider reason
according to a set of symbolically represented rules of a system of nonmonotonic logic.
This may seem strange in view of the notorious opposition of the symbolic computation
paradigm and the dynamical hypothesis paradigm (van Gelder [9]) in cognitive science.
According to Smolensky’s [30, pp. 6–7] subsymbolic hypothesis, “The intuitive processor
is a subconceptual connectionist dynamical system that does not admit a complete, formal,
and precise conceptual-level description.” However, as Gärdenfors [8] argues, the two
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paradigms should better be seen as complementing each other. Moreover, the paradigms
have originally not been viewed as being adversary at all: e.g., the seminal paper by
McCulloch and Pitts [20], which is a kind of paragon for our approach, explicitly tries
to “treat neural events and relations by means of propositional logic”.
Since its publication in the 1940s the McCulloch and Pitts model has been critized for
various reasons:
(i) the networks used are neurobiologically implausible,
(ii) single nodes are interpreted as representing propositions and thus localized
representations are employed rather than distributed ones, as connectionism has
it, and
(iii) classical propositional logic is used on the symbolic side where perhaps a system of
nonmonotonic reasoning would be more adequate, since such systems are supposed
to be closer to the commonsense reasoning our brains are usually involved in.
In the following sections we will introduce a class of networks for which claim (i) is
still true—which we accept for the sake of abstraction and simplicity—but the subsequent
results will show that the objections expressed in (ii) and (iii) would fail if they were
directed towards our approach.
The combination of neural networks with nonmonotonic reasoning has also been
suggested by a handful of other authors: Valiant [31, Chapter 13.5] discusses the
nonmonotonic phenomena occuring in both commonsense reasoning and neural network
design. Schurz [26, p. 59] explicitly compares the computations of biological and artificial
neurons to the applications of default rules in nonmonotonic reasoning. Both papers
state the general idea but omit details and results. The most extensive treatment of
this topic is to be found in Balkenius and Gärdenfors [2] and Gärdenfors [8], where
it is shown that state transitions in artificial neural networks may be considered as
nonmonotonic reasoning processes. The ideas introduced in the latter two papers have
been a major source of inspiration for various sections of this paper, in particular for
our net semantics of defeasible conditionals in Section 4. As indicated by Balkenius and
Gärdenfors [2,8], the state transitions within many neural networks lack properties which
are characteristic of plausible reasoning (like cumulativity). However, nets with so-called
“shunting” interaction of inputs (see [2, p. 33]) are hypothesized to reason cumulatively;
but this is not proven by the authors, but only suggested by extensive computer simulations.
Put shortly, the results in [2,8] are restricted in certain ways, and these restrictions seem to
be due to the complexity of signal propagation in arbitrary neural networks. This is one
reason why we restrict ourselves to the simpler case of inhibition nets (and, in Section 7,
to a subclass of the class of artificial neural networks).
The system CL referred to above is a set of rules for defeasible conditionals of the
form α ⇒ β where ⇒ is a new connective different from the material implication of
propositional logic. KLM [14] prove that CL has a sound and complete normal states
semantics for models consisting of interpreted states ordered according to their degree
of normality. A conditional α ⇒ β is true in such a model if and only if in the most
normal states among those in which α holds, β holds as well. For example, the conditional
bird ⇒ flyer would be true if and only if in the most normal environmental situations, in
which there is a distinguished object x such that x is a bird, x also has the ability to fly.
In the net semantics to be developed below the conditional α⇒ β will not be satisfied by
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models of ordered states, but by interpreted inhibition nets considered as cognitive agents.
α⇒ β is true of such an agent if and only if the agent is disposed to draw the conclusion
that β holds, whenever it has an input corresponding to the belief that α is true and α
is everything the agent is asked to believe by the input. Defeasible conditionals will thus
be used as descriptive sentences about certain cognitive properties of agents and not as
descriptive sentences about the normality structure of the world. This is, of course, not a
new way of interpreting defeasible conditionals. Basically, all autoepistemic approaches
to nonmonotonic reasoning use a logical syntax expressing various cognitive properties of
agents.
Independently, Horgan and Tienson [12] argue that ceteris paribus laws (which they call
“soft laws”) would be the appropriate laws for psychology. They regard such laws as the
“natural expression of a defeasible causal tendency” (p. 109) in a cognitive dynamical
system. Cognitive states are viewed as emitting forces which tend to activate other
cognitive states, but only if there is no further active state with a stronger contrary impulse
which defeats the first one. According to Horgan and Tienson this is best described by
ceteris paribus laws as opposed to the exceptionless “hard” laws expressible in classical
logic. As Schurz [28] (see also [29]) has shown, important cases of ceteris paribus laws
may be reconstructed formally as defeasible conditionals (called “normic conditionals”
by Schurz) ruled by the well-known system P used, e.g., by Pearl [22], KLM [14] and
Schurz [27]. The system CL employed in this paper is a subsystem of P.
2. Inhibition nets
Inhibition nets are directed graphs with two kinds of edges:
(i) edges between nodes, and
(ii) edges between nodes and edges of type (i):
Definition 2.1.
(1) Let N be a nonempty set (the set of nodes).
(2) Let E ⊆N ×N (the set of excitatory connections).
(3) Let I ⊆N ×E (the set of inhibitory connections).
(4) Let bias ∈N be fixed (the bias node).
Then I = 〈N,E, I,bias〉 is an inhibition net(work).
In the following we use ‘m’ and ‘n’ (with or without indices) as variables ranging over
nodes, ‘e’ for edges; ‘i’, ‘j ’, ‘k’, ‘u’, ‘v’ will always range over natural numbers. We will
say that m E n (or m I n), when we actually mean that 〈m,n〉 ∈E (or 〈m,n〉 ∈ I ).
It may help to think of nodes as neurons, of the excitatory connections between
nodes as excitatory connections between neurons, and of inhibitory connections as formal
counterparts of presynaptic inhibitory connections (see, e.g., Eccles [7, pp. 124–127]).
By means of the latter neurons may inhibit excitatory connections between other neurons
without inhibiting the target neurons of such connections themselves. But inhibition
nets are of course far from being plausible models of real neural assemblies. Moreover,
inhibition nets are also quite different from the usual artificial neural networks, since there
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are no weigths associated with the connections, there are no inhibitory connections from
nodes to other nodes, and, as will be seen later, there are no continuous activation states for
nodes, no weighted input summation within nodes, and no complex activation functions.
Finally, no use is made of learning procedures, as it is usually the case in neural network
design.
The bias node bias will be the only node which is active in every state of the network.
Thus we may assume that there is no n ∈N such that n E bias, since excitatory connections
to bias would be without any use anyway.
Furthermore we need the following concepts:
Definition 2.2. Let I = 〈N,E, I,bias〉 be an inhibition net:
(1) A path is a sequence n0, . . . , nk (k > 0) of nodes such that for all i ∈ {0, . . . , k− 1}:
ni E ni+1, or there is an n ∈N such that ni I 〈n,ni+1〉.
We will say that such a path has length k. Generally, if m1 E m2, or there is an
n ∈N such that m1 I 〈n,m2〉, we will say that m1 is connected to m2 (in this order).
(2) An E-path is a path n0, . . . , nk of nodes such that for all i ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1}:
ni E ni+1.
(3) A cycle is a path n0, . . . , nk where n0 = nk .
Definition 2.3. Let I = 〈N,E, I,bias〉 be an inhibition net.
I is hierarchical iff it does not have cycles.
Hierarchical inhibition nets will be shown to have the property that none of their nodes
has influence on its own activity, neither by excitation nor by inhibition. However, such
nets may, e.g., contain nodes m1, m2, n1, n2 such that m1 I 〈m2, n2〉 and m2 I 〈m1, n1〉:
in such a case m1 and m2 will mutually inhibit each other’s spreading activity. But such a
form of mutual inhibition is not circular or nonhierarchical in the sense specified above.
Contrary to arbitrary inhibition nets, hierarchical inhibition nets will be proven to have
unique stable states of activity given a constant input state. This is the reason why we will
mainly concentrate our efforts on them. Moreover, we will only focus on finite hierarchical
inhibition nets (FHINs) for the sake of simplicity, and because they are the practically
relevant ones.
Definition 2.3 obviously implies:
Remark 1. If n0, . . . , nk is a path in an FHIN, then ni = nj for i = j , because otherwise
there would be cycles. Thus in an FHIN there are only finitely many paths between two
nodes, since there are only finitely many nodes.
In Figs. 1 and 2 you can see two FHINs (in the first case we have omitted the bias node
graphically), which we will use as examples throughout the paper. They are defined in the
following way:
Example 2.4. I1 = 〈N1,E1, I1,bias〉 such that N1 = {bias, n1, n2, n3, n4} is a set of 5
nodes, n1 E1 n2, n1 E1 n3, n4 I1 〈n1, n2〉, and there are no other connections.
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Fig. 1. I1. Fig. 2. I2.
Example 2.5. I2 = 〈N2,E2, I2,bias〉 such that N = {bias, n1, n2, n3}, bias E2 n1, n2 E2
n3, n3 I2 〈bias, n1〉, and there are no other connections.
Now we will state and prove a lemma, which will give us some basic information about
the topology of FHINs:
Lemma 2.6. Let I = 〈N,E, I,bias〉 be an FHIN: then there are disjoint and nonempty
sets N0, . . . ,Nk such that N =N0 ∪ · · · ∪Nk and
(1) for all m, n ∈N such that there is a path from m to n, it holds that: m ∈Ni , n ∈Nj
for i < j ,
(2) for every n ∈N \N0 there is an m ∈N0 such that there is an E-path from m to n,
(3) N0 is the set of all nodes with (E-)indegree 0, i.e., the set of nodes without excitatory
connections leading to them,
(4) bias ∈N0.
Proof.
• 〈N,E〉 is a finite directed acyclic graph (DAG), and thus it has a unique nonempty
point base N0 ⊆N where N0 is the set of all vertices with indegree 0 (see, e.g., Harary [11,
p. 201]), i.e., for every node n ∈N \N0 there is a node m ∈N0 such that there is an E-path
from m to n, and there is no E-path between nodes in N0.
• Now let Ni be the set of nodes n ∈ N such that the maximal length of a path from
a node in N0 to n is i (for all i with 1 i). Since every node n ∈N \N0 is reachable from
a node in N0 by our selection of N0, and since there are only finitely many paths from
nodes in N \N0 to such an n (by Remark 1), there is indeed a path with maximal length to
n, i.e., there is an i such that n ∈Ni . By maximality we have Ni ∩Nj = ∅ for i = j .
• Furthermore, if Ni is not empty for some i > 0, then also Ni−1 is not empty: for there
is an n ∈Ni such that there is a maximal path m= n0, . . . , ni−1, ni = n where m ∈N0; but
thenm= n0, . . . , ni−1 is also a maximal path from a node in N0 to ni−1 and thusNi−1 = ∅,
or else there would be a longer path m0, . . . ,mk = ni−1 with m0 ∈ N0, k > i − 1; in the
latter case ni would not be one of the nodes in m0, . . . ,mk , since otherwise there would be
cycles in I; it would follow that m0, . . . ,mk,ni is a path with length k+ 1> i (mk = ni−1
is connected to ni by the existence of the path n0, . . . , ni−1, ni ); but this contradicts that
n ∈Ni .
• This implies that for some k  0 the sets N0, . . . ,Nk are disjoint, nonempty, and
N =N0 ∪ · · · ∪Nk .
• Now suppose m, n ∈N such that there is a path from m to n, where m ∈Ni , n ∈Nj :
the longest path m0, . . . ,mi =m from a node m0 in N0 to m has length i; by assumption
there is a path m= n0, . . . , nk = n from m to n; m0, . . . ,mi and n0, . . . , nk have no nodes
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in common except m, or else there would be cycles. Thus by concatenating the two paths
we see that the longest path from a node in N0 to n has length j > i .
• The last three claims from above hold because of our selection of N0, and our
assumption that there are no excitatory connections to bias. ✷
Lemma 2.6 shows that FHINs are layered (if n ∈ Ni then we will say that n is within
the layer i). We are going to see that in FHINs the activity of a node in layer i solely
depends on the activity of nodes in layers j < i . Formally, it is easier to deal with FHINs
than with arbitrary inhibition nets just because of this layered structure. Lemma 2.6 leads
to the following definition:
Definition 2.7. 〈N0, . . . ,Nk〉 (as given by Lemma 2.6) is the canonical partition of I .
Canonical partitions are in fact determined uniquely, but this is not important in the
following.
Example 2.8. In the case of I1 we get the canonical partition 〈{bias, n1, n4}, {n2, n3}〉. In
the case of I2 the canonical partition is 〈{bias, n2}, {n3}, {n1}〉.
The layered structure of FHINs is analogous to the layered structure of various neural
structures and artificial neural networks. In the latter case, however, the nodes of a layer i
may usually only be connected to the nodes of the subsequent layer i + 1, whereas in our
case the nodes of layer i may be connected to the nodes of layers with any index larger
than i , or to excitatory connections leading to nodes of such layers.
Lemma 2.6 entails the following straightforward though important remark:
Remark 2. Let n ∈Ni :
(1) ∃m ∈N such that m E n, iff ∃m ∈Nj with j < i such that m E n.
(2) ∃m′ ∈N such that m′ I 〈m,n〉 (for some m), iff ∃m′ ∈Nu with u < i such that m′ I
〈m,n〉 (for some m).
3. Inhibition nets as dynamical systems
Analogous to usual neural networks also inhibition nets may be considered as dynamical
systems. First of all, we postulate that the nodes of inhibition nets may have a certain
activity. We will restrict the types of such activity states of nodes to discrete binary states,
i.e., to 1 (“on”) and 0 (“off”).
We assume that nets are fed by inputs which dictate certain nodes to fire independently of
the current net state. This is the external causal dynamics of inhibition nets. Typically, these
inputs may be thought of as sensory inputs. The only generalization we apply compared to
the inputs to usual neural networks is that we allow inputs to affect the whole network and
not just a distinguished layer of input nodes.
The internal causal dynamics of inhibition nets is the evolution of states determined by
the input and the topology of the network. The main rule governing the state transitions
within inhibition nets is: a node n is excited if and only if
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(i) it is directly excited by the input, or
(ii) there is an excitatory connection e from a further node m to n such that m is
itself active and e is not inhibited by yet another active node which is inhibitorily
connected to e.
Thus the nodes which are connected inhibitorily to excitatory lines have a function
similar to undercutting defeaters (Pollock [23]) in defeasible logic, though on a completely
different level of computation.
Put formally, the dynamics of inhibition nets is defined as such:
Definition 3.1. Let I = 〈N,E, I,bias〉 be an inhibition net.
Let S = {s | s :N →{0,1} with s(bias)= 1} be the space of states of the net I (we will
generally omit the reference to I and just use the notation ‘S’ for the sake of simplicity).
Let s∗ ∈ S be an arbitrary state of I (the input):
let Fs∗ :S→ S such that for all n ∈N \ {bias}: Fs∗(s)(n)= 1 iff
(1) s∗(n)= 1, or
(2) ∃n1 ∈N (s(n1)= 1, n1En,¬∃n2 ∈N(s(n2)= 1, n2 I 〈n1, n〉)).
Then Fs∗ is the state transition function given relative to the input s∗ and the net I (we
will again omit the reference to I).
If s is a state of I and s(n) = 1, we say that n fires or that n is active (in s). A set of
nodes is called ‘active’ if each of its members is active. From time to time we will identify
a state (which is a function) with the set of neurons active in the very state: e.g., if we say
that s1 ⊆ s2 we actually mean that for all n ∈N : if s1(n)= 1 then s2(n)= 1.
The ‘if’ direction of the clause for Fs∗ above says that if a node is caused to fire, it
indeed fires; on the other hand, the ‘only if’ direction states that a node should only fire
if it is also caused to fire. The inhibition of an excitatory connection is always dominant
over the simultaneous impulse within the very excitatory connection. Note that the bias
node fires in every state s. The bias commits the net to a certain preferred state of minimal
energy which the net always reaches in the case of lacking “stress” (= input). Such bias
nodes are also employed in some of the usual neural networks.
For each s ∈ S (and each given input s∗ ∈ S) the iterated application of Fs∗ defines the
following trajectory of states:
t = 0 : s
t = 1 : Fs∗(s)
t = 2 : F 2s∗(s)= Fs∗(Fs∗(s))
t = 3 : F 3s∗(s)= Fs∗(Fs∗(Fs∗(s)))
...
F ks∗(s) may be considered as the net state at time k given that s has been the initial state at
time 0, and given an input s∗, which is considered to be constant for a sufficient amount of
time. 〈S,Fs∗ 〉 is a discrete dynamical system which is associated with the input s∗ and
the net I . (〈S,Fs∗ 〉)s∗∈S is a family of discrete dynamical systems associated with I .
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Fig. 3. State transition diagram for I2.
Dynamical systems such as 〈S,Fs∗ 〉 are called ‘discrete’ since they evolve in discrete
temporal steps of unit duration.
At time 0 the net is in a certain state s and an input s∗ is fed into the network. s∗ excites
a certain set of nodes and consequently each of these nodes fires at time 1. Since the input
is considered to be invariant for a sufficient temporal duration, this happens over and over
again at each of the subsequent steps. Additionally, the bias node fires at each point of time.
The “energy” emerging from the input and the bias node spreads from every step t to the
subsequent step t + 1 via the excitatory connections, but only if these connections are not
inhibited by the activity of further nodes at time t .
For example, consider I1: if n1 is the only node that fires at time 0, n2 is caused to fire
at time 1, but if both n1 and n4 fire initially, then n2 does not fire at the next step due to
inhibition.
In Fig. 3 we have depicted the complete state transition diagram for the example network
I2 given the zero input state, i.e., no node is activated by the input (in the figure the triple
〈x1, x2, x3〉 is the state in which the node ni is in state xi for 1 i  3):
In the case of an FHIN the second part of the right hand side of the ‘iff’ clause in
Definition 3.1 may be put into a different shape by the following remark:
Remark 3. Let n ∈ Ni (where I has the canonical partition 〈N0, . . . ,Nk〉, as it will be
assumed for the whole of this section):
∃n1 ∈N(s(n1)= 1, n1 En,¬∃n2 ∈N(s(n2)= 1, n2 I 〈n1, n〉)) iff
∃n1 ∈Nj with j < i such that
(s(n1)= 1, n1E n,¬∃n2 ∈Nu with u < i(s(n2)= 1, n2 I 〈n1, n〉)).
This is a consequence of Remark 2.
Due to their hierarchical structure FHINs can be shown to possess a unique stable
(resonant, equilibrium) state for each input s∗. Here we use the following definition of
a stable state:
Definition 3.2. s is a stable state under input s∗ iff Fs∗(s) = s, i.e., if s is a fixed point
of Fs∗ .
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For example, by Fig. 3 〈1,0,0〉 is the stable state of I2 for the input 〈0,0,0〉. Note that
a state s may be a stable state under the input s∗1 and a stable state under the input s∗2 at the
same time although s∗1 = s∗2 .
The “stability property” of FHINs is stated by the following theorem:
Theorem 3.3 (Stability property). For every FHIN I = 〈N,E, I,bias〉, for every s∗ ∈ S
there is exactly one stable state s of I under the input s∗.
Proof.
(1) First we show existence:
let s :N →{0,1} be inductively defined such that
• for all n ∈N0: s(n)= 1 iff (s∗(n)= 1 or n= bias),
• for all n ∈Ni (i > 0): s(n)= 1 iff (s∗(n)= 1 or ∃n1 ∈Nj with j < i(s(n1)= 1,
n1E n,¬∃n2 ∈Nu with u < i(s(n2)= 1, n2 I 〈n1, n〉))). It is easy to see that s is
a stable state under input s∗ (use Remark 3).
(2) Uniqueness may be shown inductively (we leave this to the reader). ✷
Theorem 3.3 justifies the following definition:
Definition 3.4. For every FHIN I let Cl :S→ S such that Cl(s∗) is the unique stable state
under input s (actually, Cl = ClI , but we will often drop the index ‘I’). Cl is the closure
operator of I , Cl(s∗) is the closure of s∗.
In Table 1 we have listed the closure states for the example net I1.
Stable (resonant) states play an excellent role in the literature on neural networks. Often
they are considered to be the “answers” of neural networks to inputs (=“questions”), and
this is also our motivation for studying such states.
FHINs do not only possess unique stable states Cl(s∗) for all input s∗, but the states
of an FHIN may even be shown to finally converge to Cl(s∗) under the constant input s∗
where the selection of the initial state s is irrelevant:
Theorem 3.5 (Convergence property). For every FHIN I = 〈N,E, I,bias〉, every input
s∗ and every initial state s:
F is∗(s) N0∪···∪Ni−1≡ Cl(s∗) N0∪···∪Ni−1 (for 0 < i  k),
i.e., F is∗(s) is identical to Cl(s∗) on all nodes in N0 ∪ · · · ∪Ni−1.
Proof. Straightforward by induction over indices i of the partition sets. ✷
Now we can specify what we have meant by qualifying an input as ‘constant for a
sufficient amount of time’, as we have done in Section 1: if i > k where k is the number of
layers of I , then F is∗(s)= Cl(s∗), i.e.: if the input is constant for more than k units of time,
the net definitely converges to a stable state which is only dependent on the input. This
also entails that the iterated application of Fs∗ does not generate any cycles apart from the
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Table 1
Closure states for I1
Input Closure
〈0,0,0,0〉 〈0,0,0,0〉
〈0,0,0,1〉 〈0,0,0,1〉
〈0,0,1,0〉 〈0,0,1,0〉
〈0,0,1,1〉 〈0,0,1,1〉
〈0,1,0,0〉 〈0,1,0,0〉
〈0,1,0,1〉 〈0,1,0,1〉
〈0,1,1,1〉 〈0,1,1,1〉
〈1,0,0,0〉 〈1,1,1,0〉
〈1,0,0,1〉 〈1,0,1,1〉
〈1,0,1,0〉 〈1,1,1,0〉
〈1,0,1,1〉 〈1,0,1,1〉
〈1,1,0,0〉 〈1,1,1,0〉
〈1,1,0,1〉 〈1,1,1,1〉
〈1,1,1,0〉 〈1,1,1,0〉
〈1,1,1,1〉 〈1,1,1,1〉
single loop Fs∗(Cl(s∗))= Cl(s∗) of length one. In the terminology of dynamical systems
we might say that Cl(s∗) is the only periodic state of 〈S,Fs∗ 〉.
Due to the presence of inhibitory connections the state transitions in inhibition nets
are generally not monotonic, i.e., if s1 ⊆ s2 then it does not necessarily follow that also
Cl(s1) ⊆ Cl(s2). For example, in the case of I1 we have {n1} ⊆ {n1, n3} but Cl({n1}) =
{n1, n2} {n1, n3} = Cl({n1, n3}).
But, obviously, at least the following holds:
Remark 4.
(1) For every FHIN I = 〈N,E, I,bias〉, for every state s: s ⊆ Cl(s) (Inclusion).
(2) For every FHIN I = 〈N,E, I,bias〉, for every state s: Cl(s)= Cl(Cl(s)) (Idempo-
tence).
(3) For every FHIN I = 〈N,E,∅,bias〉 (i.e., without inhibitory connections) the
operator Cl is monotonic.
(4) For every FHIN I = 〈N,E, I,bias〉, for every state s: s ∩N0 = Cl(s)∩N0.
As a kind of substitute for monotonicity the following two weakenings of monotonicity
may be proven:
Lemma 3.6. For every FHIN I = 〈N,E, I,bias〉, for all states s1, s2:
if s1 ⊆ s2 ⊆ Cl(s1), then Cl(s1)= Cl(s2).
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Proof. Assume that s1 ⊆ s2 ⊆ Cl(s1); by induction over the partition sets:
(1) Induction basis. N0 ∩ Cl(s1) = N0 ∩ Cl(s2), since N0 ∩ s1 = N0 ∩ Cl(s1) (by
Remark 4).
(2) Induction step. Now assume that for all m ∈ N0 ∪ · · · ∪ Ni (i < k): Cl(s1)(m) =
Cl(s2)(m). Let n ∈Ni+1: if n ∈ s1 ⊆ s2 then Cl(s1)(n)= Cl(s2)(n) and we are done. Thus
suppose n /∈ s1:
Cl(s1)(n)= 1 iff
∃n1 ∈Nu with u < i + 1 such that
(Cl(s1)(n1) = 1, n1E n,¬∃n2 ∈ Nv with v < i + 1(Cl(s1)(n2) = 1, n2 I 〈n1, n〉)) iff, by
inductive assumption,
∃n1 ∈Nu with u < i + 1 such that
(Cl(s2)(n1) = 1, n1E n,¬∃n2 ∈ Nv with v < i + 1(Cl(s2)(n2) = 1, n2 I 〈n1, n〉)) which
implies that Cl(s2)(n)= 1.
On the other hand if Cl(s2)(n) = 1 then necessarily s2(n) = 0 and thus ∃n1 ∈ Nu with
u < i + 1 such that
(Cl(s2)(n1) = 1, n1En,¬∃n2 ∈ Nv with v < i + 1(Cl(s2)(n2) = 1, n2 I 〈n1, n〉)), since
otherwise s2(n)= 1, while simultaneously ¬(∃n1 ∈Nu with u < i + 1 such that
(Cl(s1)(n1) = 1, n1E n,¬∃n2 ∈ Nv with v < i + 1(Cl(s1)(n2) = 1, n2 I 〈n1, n〉))) by
inductive assumption and n /∈ s1 by indirect assumption from above; thus in this case we
would have that Cl(s1)(n)= 0, which would contradict s2 ⊆ Cl(s1).
So we have that Cl(s1)(n)= 1 iff Cl(s2)(n)= 1. ✷
If Cl were an operator on sets of formulas it would thus be called ‘cumulative’ according
to common usage (see Makinson [18, p. 43]).
Lemma 3.7. For every FHIN I = 〈N,E, I,bias〉, for all states s0, . . . , sj :
if s1 ⊆ Cl(s0), s2 ⊆ Cl(s1), . . . , sj ⊆ Cl(sj−1), s0 ⊆ Cl(sj ),
then Cl(sr )= Cl(sr ′) for r, r ′ ∈ {0, . . . , j }.
Proof. Assume that s1 ⊆ Cl(s0), s2 ⊆ Cl(s1), . . . , sj ⊆ Cl(sj−1), s0 ⊆ Cl(sj ). Now by
induction over the partition sets (within this proof summation of indices is understood
modulo j + 1):
(1) Induction basis. Again by Remark 4 we have N0 ∩ Cl(s0) ⊇ N0 ∩ Cl(s1) ⊇ · · · ⊇
N0 ∩Cl(sj )⊇N0 ∩Cl(s0), and thus N0 ∩Cl(s0)=N0 ∩Cl(s1)= · · · =N0 ∩Cl(sj ).
(2) Induction step. Suppose that for all n ∈ (N0 ∪ · · · ∪ Ni) with i < k: Cl(sr )(n) =
Cl(sr ′)(n) for r , r ′ ∈ {0, . . . , j }; let n ∈Ni+1, r ∈ {0, . . . , j }:
assume that Cl(sr )(n)= 0: then n /∈ sr and ¬∃m ∈Nu with
u < i + 1(Cl(sr )(m)= 1,m E n,¬∃m′ ∈Nv with v < i + 1 such that
(Cl(sr )(m′)= 1,m′ I 〈m,n〉)).
Now suppose Cl(sr+1)(n) = 1: by inductive assumption ¬∃m ∈ Nu with u < i + 1 such
that
(Cl(sr+1)(m)= 1,m E n,¬∃m′ ∈Nv with v < i + 1 such that
(Cl(sr+1)(m′) = 1,m′ I 〈m,n〉)); therefore, n would have to be a member of sr+1.
But since sr+1 ⊆ Cl(sr ), Cl(sr )(n) would be 1, contradicting Cl(sr )(n) = 0. Thus also
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Cl(sr+1)(n) = 0 and by the same reasoning pattern Cl(sr ′)(n) = 0 for all r ′ ∈ {0, . . . , j }.
If Cl(sr )(n) = 1 for some r then there cannot be an r ′ such that Cl(sr ′)(n) = 0, because
otherwise we would get a contradiction by inferring that Cl(sr )(n) = 0, as before. So,
Cl(sr )(n)= Cl(sr ′)(n) for r , r ′ ∈ {0, . . . , j }. ✷
If Cl were an operator on sets of formulas it would therefore be called to satisfy ‘Loop’
(see KLM [14, p. 187]).
Although inhibition nets obey the very simple local activation rule stated in Defini-
tion 3.1, they may nevertheless be quite complex automata. This is indicated by the fol-
lowing two theorems:
Theorem 3.8. Every Boolean mapping f : {0,1}i →{0,1} may be computed by an FHIN
in the sense that there are i (“input”) nodes n1, . . . , ni and one (“output”) node nf in
the network, such that for all 〈x1, . . . , xi〉 ∈ {0,1}i: if s∗(n1) = x1, . . . , s∗(ni) = xi then
Cl(s∗)(nf )= f (x1, . . . , xi).
Proof. A (sub)net containing the three nodes bias, n, n¬, the excitatory edge 〈bias, n¬〉,
the inhibitory edge 〈n, 〈bias, n¬〉〉 and which contains no other edges computes the truth
value of the “negation” node n¬ of n. A (sub)net containing the three nodes n1, n2, n∨,
the excitatory edges 〈n1, n∨〉 and 〈n2, n∨〉 and which contains no other edges computes the
truth value of the “disjunction” n∨ of n1 and n2. Here ‘computation’ is understood again
in the following sense: if s∗ is given by a classical evaluation of n, or n1 and n2, then Fs∗
applied iteratively will obviously turn s∗ into a stable state in which n¬ fires iff n does not
fire, and in which n∨ fires iff n1 fires or n2 fires. But since every propositional formula
with i propositional variables is logically equivalent to a formula which has the same set
of propositional variables but in which only the negation and the disjunction sign are used
as logical connectives, every Boolean function f may be computed by composition of
subnets isomorphic to those sketched before. ✷
Theorem 3.9.
(1) Every finite inhibition net is a finite state machine.
(2) Every finite state machine (FSM) may be simulated by a finite inhibition net (FIN)
in the following sense: for every internal state q of the FSM there is a corresponding
(“internal state”) node nq in the FIN; for every input i of the FSM there is a
corresponding (“input”) node ni in the FIN; for every output o of the FSM there
is a corresponding (“output”) node no in the FIN; if λ is the next-state function
of the FSM, and δ is the next-output function of the FSM, there is a fixed natural
number c, such that for arbitrary internal states q and inputs i of the FSM, it holds:
λ(q, i)= q ′ and δ(q, i)= o iff Fc{ni }({nq})= {nq ′, no}.
Proof. The first claim is a direct consequence of the definition of inhibition nets and the
definition of finite state machines (see, e.g., Arbib [1, p. 8]). The set of inputs and the set
of outputs of a finite state machine may simply be identified with the state space S.
The second claim is proven in the same way as it is shown that a McCulloch–Pitts net
may simulate every finite state machine (see Rojas [25, pp. 47f]). The only adaptation to be
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made is that McCulloch–Pitts nodes with threshold 2 have to be replaced by “conjunction
nodes”—this is possible according to Theorem 3.8. c depends on the depth of the subnet
that is used to compute Boolean conjunction. Where only input lines and output lines
are used in [25], we add the corresponding input nodes and output nodes. Of course, the
representation of a finite state machine by a McCulloch–Pitts net or by an inhibition net is
generally a notoriously inefficient one. ✷
Note that not every finite state machine can be simulated by an FHIN, since the latter are
hierarchical, and thus they generally cannot simulate FSMs where the next-state function
leads to loops in the internal state transition.
As a final remark on the dynamics of inhibition nets we want to justify the restriction to
hierarchical inhibition nets by the simple fact that nonhierarchical inhibition nets violate
the stability property (and therefore also the convergence property):
Lemma 3.10.
(1) For some nonhierarchical nets I = 〈N,E, I,bias〉 there are inputs s∗ such that
there is no stable state under s∗.
(2) For some nonhierarchical nets I = 〈N,E, I,bias〉 there are inputs s∗ such that
there is more than one stable state under s∗.
Proof.
(1) For example, let N = {bias,m} such that E = {〈bias,m〉} and I = {〈m, 〈bias,m〉〉};
let s∗ be the state in which only the bias fires. Then it is easy to see that there is
no state s of I = 〈N,E, I,bias〉 stable under input s∗. Call m in I the “Inhibition
Liar”.
(2) For example, let N = {bias, n} such that E = {〈n,n〉} and I = ∅; let s∗ again
be the state in which only the bias fires. Then there are distinct states s1, s2
of I = 〈N,E, I,bias〉 stable under input s∗ such that s1(bias) = s2(bias) = 1,
s1(n)= 1, s2(n)= 0. Call n in I the “Inhibition Truthteller”. ✷
Lemma 3.10 does not imply that nonhierarchical inhibition nets are “defective” in any
way. It just shows that they induce activity patterns in far more complicated ways than the
hierarchical nets, since the latter exclude feedback. This gain of simplicity is one reason
why we restrict ourselves to the study of FHINs within this paper. A second reason is that
it is not so clear what we should count as the “answer” of a nonhierarchical net to an input
since there is generally no single stable state or no stable state at all.
4. Inhibition nets as cognitive agents
We have advertized inhibition nets in the beginning as kinds of formal imitations of
biological “brainware”, though on a very high level of abstraction. But brains are (among
others) cognitive agents. In this section we are looking for an analogous assessment of
inhibition nets as being cognitive.
We consider a cognitive agent to be a dynamical system
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(i) the states of which are (identified with) states of belief, and
(ii) the state transitions of which are (identified with) inferences.
We choose a ternary belief predicate of agents, states and sentences in order to
ascribe beliefs to agents in a certain state. Contents of belief are regarded as sentences.
Alternatively, one may reinterpret ‘the agent believes in the state s the sentence ϕ’ by ‘the
agent believes in the state s the proposition expressed by the sentence ϕ’. Moreover, we will
take the following assumption for granted: the cognitive agents considered in this paper are
rational in various respects to be explained in the following sections. In particular, they are
supposed to be rational concerning the classical consequences of their beliefs, i.e., if such
an agent believes α in s and it also believes α→ β in s, then it also believes β in s. Note
that our cognitive agents will not have to draw any kind of inference in order to believe
β in such a case, since they will “automatically” be in a state of believing β , whenever
they are in a state in which they simultaneously believe α and α → β . There are three
reasons for adopting this rationality assumption: first of all, we are primarily concerned
with nonmonotonic reasoning in this paper and thus we do not want to struggle around with
more complicated accounts of classical reasoning; secondly, our efforts may be viewed as
the study of a certain normative ideal with which the more realistic models of cognition
may be compared; finally, assumptions as the ones above are typically made whenever a
standard account of doxastic or epistemic logic with operators is employed, and we decide
to adopt this convention.
A further peculiarity of the beliefs we ascribe to inhibition nets is that they are idenfied
with causally active patterns of excitation, and thus they are not dispositions as they are
often supposed to be. The reason for this decision is that we think of the beliefs we
consider as short-term perceptive beliefs about the current state of the environment, and
also currently excited by external stimulation.
In order to ascribe beliefs to inhibition nets we use a sentential language L (the
“factual” language) consisting of finitely many propositional variables and closed under the
application of the standard logical connectives (¬,∧,∨,→,↔,,⊥) in the usual manner.
L neither contains quantifiers, nor any defeasible conditional, nor a nonstandard connective
of a different kind. We use small Greek letters with or without indices as metavariables
ranging over the formulas of L. A formula ϕ is used to ascribe to a net the belief that ϕ is
the case. Since we do not consider beliefs of higher order in this paper we avoid introducing
a belief operator or a belief predicate into the object language L itself.
Net states and belief states are considered to be associated in the following way:
Postulate for Belief States:
a net agent believes ϕ in a state s iff the set I(ϕ) of nodes is active in s.
I(ϕ) is the pattern of activity associated with ϕ; if I = 〈N,E, I,bias〉 is the inhibition
net considered, then I(ϕ) is a subset of N and we may always assume that bias ∈ I(ϕ)
since the bias node fires anyway. We say that I(ϕ) is the (pattern) interpretation of ϕ, and
I is the interpretation mapping. Whenever the pattern I(ϕ) is active in a net state, the net
has a belief the content of which is ϕ. Since it is possible that I(ϕ) = I(ψ) although
ϕ = ψ , one and the same pattern may be the interpretation of different sentences (in
fact it may be shown from the postulates below that every pattern is the interpretation
of infinitely many sentences). This is a form of distributed representation, i.e., the kind
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of representation intended to be characteristic of connectionist approaches to cognition. Its
envisioned opponent is the strictly local form of representation by which each item (atomic
or complex) is represented by the activity of a single node: e.g., your Grandma would be
represented by the firing of a single “Grandmother neuron”. This type of “one item-one
node” representation would lead to a rather uneconomical cognitive system if employed
universally. For more on the difference between distributed and local representation see,
e.g., van Gelder [10].
We demand the following
Postulates for I:
(1) T HI = {ϕ ∈ L | I(ϕ) = {bias}} is a consistent deductively closed set of factual
formulas, i.e., a consistent theory in L.
(2) For all ϕ, ψ ∈L: if T HI ! ϕ→ψ then I(ϕ)⊇ I(ψ).
(3) For all ϕ, ψ ∈L: I(ϕ ∧ψ)= I(ϕ)∪ I(ψ).
(4) I(⊥)=N (⊥ is the logical falsum).
(5) For all ϕ ∈ L: bias ∈ I(ϕ).
Note that it would suffice to postulate only [(3′): for all ϕ, ψ ∈ L: I(ϕ ∧ ψ) ⊆
I(ϕ) ∪ I(ψ)] in the light of T HI ! ϕ ∧ ψ → ϕ, T HI ! ϕ ∧ ψ → ψ , and thus by (2),
I(ϕ ∧ψ)⊇ I(ϕ)∪ I(ψ).
The postulates are motivated in the following way:
Concerning (1): T HI is the set of formulas ϕ such that ϕ is believed by the net in
every possible state (since I(ϕ) = {bias} ⊆ s for arbitrary s). E.g., if a net is to believe
that penguins are birds without any exception, then penguin → bird should be contained
in T HI, i.e., I(penguin→ bird) should be identical to {bias}. Since we restrict ourselves
to rational agents, the set T HI should be both consistent and deductively closed.
Concerning (2): if T HI ! ϕ→ ψ the net believes ϕ→ ψ in every state. Now suppose
the net is in the state I(ϕ), i.e., all and only the nodes within I(ϕ) fire; in this case the net
also believes ϕ. According to the rationality assumption the net agent should also believe
ψ in this case, but according to the way we associate net states with belief states this entails
that I(ϕ)⊇ I(ψ). We forgo to postulate also the direction from the right to the left, i.e.,
[if I(ϕ)⊇ I(ψ) then also T HI ! ϕ→ ψ] since this will have some technical advantages
concerning the proof of the representation theorem in the next section. If T HI ! ϕ→ ψ
we say that ϕ implies ψ according to T HI, or that ϕ is stronger than ψ (ψ is weaker than
ϕ) according to T HI. Analogously, if I(ϕ)⊇ I(ψ) we say that ϕ implies ψ according to
I, or that ϕ is stronger than ψ (ψ is weaker than ϕ) according to I.
Concerning (3): at first glance it may seem strange that the interpretation of a conjunction
should be identical to the union of the component interpretations—generally, we are
used to define it by the intersection of the component values. On the other hand,
this postulate intuitively matches the interpretation of neurons as “elementary-feature
detectors”: suppose there are just two neurons n1 and n2; n1 fires iff a red object has
been detected, whereas n2 fires iff a large object has been detected. If now a both red and
large object has been detected, this will be the case if and only if both n1 and n2 fire, i.e.,
the set of firing neurons will be identical to the union of {bias, n1} and {bias, n2} and not
to their intersection.
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Concerning (4): this is a kind of “normalization” postulate; if one likes to get rid of it,
one may simply replace ‘N ’ in the considerations below by ‘I(⊥)’.
Concerning (5): bias fires in every state anyway.
Although postulate (3) is intuitively supported by what we have just pointed out above,
the restriction to Is satisfying this postulate is not as “innocent” as it may seem: e.g.,
say, in the example above there is an additional neuron n3 which fires iff a red and large
object has been observed. In this case n3 neither necessarily fires when a red object has
been detected, nor when a large object has been detected. Thus n3 should be a member of
I(red∧ large), but n3 should not be a member of I(red)∪I(large), or so it seems. But such
a situation is excluded by postulate (3). So we should better deal in more detail with the
consequences of our postulates regarding the interpretation of the patterns {bias, n}, which
are the borderline cases of distributed representation (such patterns are sometimes even
called ‘local’ although they should not be mixed up with the strictly local representation
by nodes n: see van Gelder [10, p. 236]).
A partial hint is given by postulate (2): it says that the stronger a formula is (according
to T HI or I), the larger its interpretation; or, put inversely: the weaker a formula is,
the smaller its interpretation. For example, the falsum ⊥ implies every formula α since
T HI ! ⊥→ α for all α ∈ L. Correspondingly, its interpretation is the largest possible
image under I (which is by normalization identical to N ). On the other hand, the verum
 is implied by every formula α, since T HI ! α →  for all α ∈ L, and thus its
interpretation is the smallest possible one (= {bias}). Now suppose I(ϕ) = {bias, n}: in
such a case ϕ is strictly stronger than  according to T HI and thus also according
to I, since T HI ! ϕ →, but T HI  → ϕ, because otherwise also T HI ! ϕ and
I(ϕ) = {bias} = {bias, n}; moreoever, there is no ψ such that ψ is both strictly stronger
than  and strictly weaker than ϕ according to T HI, since in this case we would have
{bias} = I()  I(ψ)  I(ϕ) = {bias, n}, which is impossible. Therefore the pattern
{bias, n} corresponds to a “basic” state of belief having a content of minimal strength
(a “microfeature”) except for the beliefs the agent has in every possible state. All states
of belief having stronger contents than such minimal ones are superpositions of minimal
belief patterns. For example, if I(ϕ)= {bias, n1}, and I(ψ)= {bias, n2}, then I(ϕ ∧ψ)=
{bias, n1, n2} by postulate (3), and there is no pattern {bias, n} having ϕ∧ψ as its content.
This is the kind of assumption that is implicitly contained in our postulates (1)–(4).
If we combine the notion of a net with that of an interpretation we get the notion of an
interpreted network, which is the cornerstone of all of our further investigations:
Definition 4.1. An interpreted (inhibition) networkN is a triple 〈I,L,I〉, where
(1) I = 〈N,E, I,bias〉 is an FHIN such that Cl({bias})N ,
(2) L is a language as characterized above, and
(3) I :L→ ℘(N) is a mapping satisfying the postulates (1)–(5) from above.
Interpreted networks are (formal models of) cognitive agents which are built from
inhibition nets. We have added the further constraint that Cl({bias}) N since otherwise
for every state s Lemma 3.6 would entail that Cl(s) = N , since {bias} ⊆ s ⊆ N =
Cl({bias}). In this case the cognitive activity generated by an interpreted network would
trivially converge to a stable state identical to the interpretation of the logical falsum, i.e.,
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such an agent would always finally believe a contradiction, which would contradict our
rationality assumption.
A partially interpreted (inhibition) network is defined analogously to Definition 4.1 with
the minor difference that there is a distinguished subset N of N such that Cl({bias})N ,
I :L→ ℘(N), and I(⊥) = N . In this case the nodes contained in N \ N may be used
as auxiliary “inter-neurons” without any representational function. It is easy to see that all
of the results stated below would also turn out to be true if we decided to use partially
interpreted networks instead of totally interpreted ones. We opt for the latter just for the
sake of simplicity. It is only in the Sections 6 and 7 that we will refer to partially interpreted
networks.
Definition 4.1 directly entails:
Corollary 4.2.
• I(ϕ ∨ ψ) ⊆ I(ϕ) ∩ I(ψ) (since T HI ! ϕ → ϕ ∨ ψ , T HI ! ψ → ϕ ∨ ψ , and
postulate (2)).
• I(ϕ)∪ I(¬ϕ)= I(ϕ ∧¬ϕ)= I(⊥)=N .
• (N \ I(ϕ))∪ {bias} ⊆ I(¬ϕ) (because of the previous line).
• I()= {bias}.
• If T HI ! ϕ↔ψ then I(ϕ)= I(ψ) (because of postulate (2)). Thus, e.g.,
I(ϕ ∧ (ϕ→ψ))= I(ϕ ∧ψ).
From a neurophysiological point of view it may again seem strange to assume that the
activity pattern associated with believing ¬ϕ has to be a superset of the complement
of the pattern associated with believing ϕ, as it is stated by the third line of the last
corollary. However, this fact is just another consequence of the assumption that beliefs
are the superpositions of basic beliefs. Of course we do not claim that this assumption
holds for every single part of a biological or artificial brain, but it might nevertheless be an
economical way of representation which could be employed in certain substructures.
Example 4.3. Let N = {bias, n1, n2, n3, n4}, let L be built up from the propositional
variables red and large, and let us assume that
I
(
(red ∧ large)∨ (red ∧¬large)∨ (¬red ∧ large))= {bias, n1},
I
(
(red ∧ large)∨ (red ∧¬large)∨ (¬red ∧¬large))= {bias, n2},
I
(
(red ∧ large)∨ (¬red ∧ large)∨ (¬red ∧¬large))= {bias, n3},
I
(
(red ∧¬large)∨ (¬red ∧ large)∨ (¬red ∧¬large))= {bias, n4}.
So, e.g., n1 fires iff the agent believes that there is some object right in front of him
which is either red and large, or red and not large, or not red and large. The only possibility
excluded is the combination of being not red and not large. Analogously for the nodes
n2, n3, n4. The patterns {bias, ni} for i = 1,2,3,4 are the basic patterns having minimal
content except for the pattern only containing the bias node, which corresponds to the
belief that there is anything there without any further qualification (thus this belief is
always true). Intuitively, if a red object is detected, the nodes bias, n1, n2 should fire
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simultaneously, while if an object is detected which is not red, the nodes bias, n2, n4 should
fire. If I is an interpretation mapping we can indeed derive that I(red) = {bias, n1, n2},
I(large)= {bias, n1, n3}, I(¬red) = {bias, n3, n4}, I(¬large) = {bias, n2, n4}. The latter
patterns are superpositions of the basic patterns given above. In this case the pattern
associated with believing ¬red is identical to complement of the pattern associated with
believing red, if we disregard the bias node, and analogously for ¬large and large.
Since interpretation mappings generally lack inductive clauses for negation and
disjunction, not every such mapping may be defined by fixing the interpretation of the
propositional variables and extending the interpretation recursively to the complex factual
formulas. Thus one may ask how difficult it is in general to construct such interpretation
mappings. The answer is that such a construction may be achieved easily by means of
assigning sets of worlds to nodes. By a world we mean a truth value assignment for the
propositional variables in L. Satisfaction by worlds is defined just as usual.
The next definition shows the method of construction:
Definition 4.4. Let W be the set of worlds for L, I :L→ ℘(N) an interpretation.
Furthermore, let l :N \ {bias}→ ℘(W) \ {∅} (a labelling function):
(1) Let I[l] :L→ ℘(N) be defined by I[l](ϕ)= {bias} ∪ {n ∈N \ {bias} |not: n |≡ ϕ}
(where we use the satisfaction relation |≡ defined in Definition A.6 of Appendix A
for states in cumulative-ordered models relative to a labelling l; thus the satisfaction
relation is actually dependent on the choice of l).
(2) Let l[I] :N \ {bias}→ ℘(W) \ {∅} be defined by
l[I](n)= {w ∈W | ∀ϕ ∈ L: n /∈ I(ϕ)→w |= ϕ}.
l[I](n) cannot be empty for since {ϕ ∈L | n /∈ I(ϕ)} is a consistent theory; l[I](bias) is
identical to W .
Note that both I[l] and l[I] are defined by negated clauses. This is due to the definition
of interpretation mappings by which the classical connectives are interpreted dually to their
standard interpretation in possible worlds semantics (e.g., conjunctions are given by unions
of interpretations, the verum is given by the least image under I, etc.).
Theorem 4.5. Let I :L→ ℘(N) be an interpretation, l :N \ {bias} → ℘(W) \ {∅} a
labelling:
(1) I[l] is an interpretation.
(2) l[I] is a labelling.
(3) I[l[I]] = I, l[I[l]] = l.
Proof. The proof is not difficult and left to the reader. Only standard reasoning in classical
propositional logic for a language with finitely many propositional variables is needed. ✷
As we have seen, labelling functions may be used to define interpretation mappings in a
neat way. But the net semantics as such does not presuppose a possible worlds semantics
in any way.
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Example 4.6. Let N = {bias, n1, n2}; let L be based on just two propositional variables p
and q ; let W = {w1,w2,w3,w4} be the set of possible worlds for L, such that w1 |= p∧q ,
w2 |= p∧¬q ,w3 |= ¬p∧q , w4 |= ¬p∧¬q . Let l :N \{bias}→℘(W)\{∅} be a labelling
of N , such that l(n1) = {w1,w2}, and l(n2) = {w1,w3}. Thus, e.g., n1 |≡ p, but neither
n1 |≡ q , nor n1 |≡ ¬q ; n2 |≡ q , but neither n2 |≡ p, nor n2 |≡ ¬p.
It follows that, e.g.,
I[l](p)= {bias} ∪ {n ∈N \ {bias} | not: n |≡ p}= {bias, n2},
I[l](q)= {bias} ∪ {n ∈N \ {bias} | not: n |≡ q}= {bias, n1},
I[l](¬p)= {bias} ∪ {n ∈N \ {bias} | not: n |≡ ¬p}= {bias, n1, n2},
I[l](¬q)= {bias} ∪ {n ∈N \ {bias} | not: n |≡ ¬q}= {bias, n1, n2}.
It is easy to see that
l[I[l]](n1)=
{
w ∈W | ∀ϕ ∈ L: n1 /∈ I[l](ϕ)→w |= ϕ
}= {w1,w2} = l(n1),
and that also
l[I[l]](n2)=
{
w ∈W | ∀ϕ ∈ L: n2 /∈ I[l](ϕ)→w |= ϕ
}= {w1,w3} = l(n2).
Now let us return to the association of net states and belief states, which we have stated
informally in Section 2. It may be put precisely as such:
Definition 4.7. Let N= 〈I,L,I〉 be an interpreted network. Let s be a state in the state
space S of I:
Bel(N, s, ϕ) iff I(ϕ)⊆ s
(in words:N believes in s the formula ϕ, if the pattern associated with ϕ is active in s).
Remark 5. It follows that
• (Bel(N, s, ϕ) and Bel(N, s,ψ)) iff Bel(N, s, ϕ ∧ψ),
• if Bel(N, s, ϕ) and Bel(N, s, ϕ→ ψ), then Bel(N, s,ψ),
• if Bel(N, s, ϕ) or Bel(N, s,ψ), then Bel(N, s, ϕ ∨ψ),
• Bel(N, s,),
• given ¬Bel(N, s,⊥): if Bel(N, s,¬ϕ) then ¬Bel(N, s, ϕ).
These are conditions we usually expect a belief predicate to satisfy.
Apart from belief simpliciter we can also introduce the concept of a total belief
expressed by an all-the-agent-believes predicate in the style of Levesque [15]:
Definition 4.8. Let N= 〈I,L,I〉 be an interpreted network. Let s be a state in the state
space S of I:
AllBel(N, s, ϕ) iff I(ϕ)= s
(in words: all that N believes in s is the formula ϕ, if the pattern associated with ϕ is
identical to the set of active nodes in s).
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Definition 4.8 is motivated by the following obvious remark:
Remark 6.
• if AllBel(N, s, ϕ) then Bel(N, s, ϕ),
• if AllBel(N, s, ϕ) and ψ is strictly stronger than ϕ (according to T HI or I), then
¬Bel(N, s,ψ),
• if AllBel(N, s, ϕ) and Bel(N, s,ψ), then ψ is weaker than ϕ according to I (but not
necessarily according to T HI).
In order to check whether it is the case that AllBel(N, s, ϕ), it is necessary to consider
N’s total current state s; in order to check whether Bel(N, s, ϕ), it is generally sufficient to
look for certain substates of s.
Now let us turn to the dynamic aspects of cognition. At a time t an interpreted network
N may be exhibit certain activities called ‘inferences’. We regard inferences as
(i) being caused by an input which makes N believe that a certain set of premises
holds, and
(ii) having a final equilibrium state (a “reflective” equilibrium), in which N believes
that a certain set of conclusions holds.
The final state of an inference is thus identical to the closure of its input state, i.e., the
stable state into which the current net state is transformed under the given input according
to the dynamics of the network. We may think of the closure state as a plausible hypothesis
generated by the agent in light of the evidence given by the input. In the next section we
will show that the inferences which interpreted inhibition nets are disposed to draw are
always closed under the rules of a well-known system of nonmonotonic logic. In order to
demonstrate this it is first necessary to describe qualitatively, i.e., in nonnumerical terms,
which inferences an inhibition net is actually disposed to draw. This may be done by the
means of conditionals α⇒ β , which are descriptive sentences stating that the agent N is
disposed to draw a nonmonotonic inference such that
(i) the input of the inference is s∗,
(ii) if s∗ were N’s actual state then all that N would believe would be α, and
(iii) the inference converges to the stable state Cl(s∗), in whichN believes β .
Put shortly we might say: α⇒ β states that N is disposed to draw the nonmonotonic
inference from the total belief of α to the final belief of β . But, in a sense, this latter
reading of the conditional α⇒ β does not exactly render what is actually going on while
such an inference is drawn: on the one hand the consequent of α⇒ β is certainly a correct
description of what N believes at the final state of such an inference, since by assumption
N indeed believes β in Cl(s∗). But on the other hand the fact that the input s∗ is identical
to I(α) by assumption does not necessarily entail that N is actually in the state s∗ at time
0 or later, since N may initially be in virtually any state only depending onN’s “cognitive
past”. However, after one iteration of the transition function Fs∗ N at least believes α,
and due to the convergence property this belief is the only one which is causally active
concerning the long-time behaviour of the network. Alternatively, we might imagine that
all of the activities of nodes are erased before a new inference is initiated, and that the
initial state of an inference is set to the input state s∗ = I(α), in which all that N believes
is indeed α.
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Now let us put this into formal terms: let L⇒ (the “conditional” language) be the set
of conditionals α ⇒ β , where α, β ∈ L. We do not allow any nestings of ⇒, nor any
concatenations of factual formulas and conditionals.
Definition 4.9. Let N= 〈I,L,I〉 be an interpreted network:
For α⇒ β ∈ L⇒ we say that
N |= α⇒ β
(α⇒ β is true in N) iff for all s ∈ S: if AllBel(N, s, α) then Bel(N,Cl(s), β).
The last definition has the following equivalent (re-)formulations:
Remark 7. N |= α⇒ β iff Bel(N,Cl(I(α)),β) iff I(β)⊆ Cl(I(α)).
A clause similar to the last one of Remark 7 is used by Gärdenfors [8, p. 63], in order to
introduce nonmonotonic inferences to neural networks. The only minor difference is that
Gärdenfors does not interpret object languages by patterns, but instead he talks about the
patterns in the metalanguage without making use of an object language at all.
An agent’s disposition to draw a nonmonotonic inference from the total belief of α to
the final belief of β may itself be termed a “belief”, but now this is a conditional belief
of higher order compared to the level of the factual beliefs considered above. The content
of such a belief could be identified with the objective conditional stating that the normal
α-situations are also β-situations. Conditional beliefs are not represented in the network
by patterns of activity but by the topology of the network. Such a way of coding, however,
is again a distributed kind of representation.
Using Definition 4.9 we can associate theories of conditionals with interpreted networks:
Definition 4.10. Let T H⇒(N)= {α⇒ β |N |= α⇒ β}.
T H⇒(N) is the conditional theory corresponding to N.
T H⇒(N) is the total description of the set of nonmonotonic inferences N is disposed
to draw. Calling T H⇒(N) a conditional theory will be justified by Lemma 5.2 in the next
section.
The following definitions are in perfect analogy to the introduction of the usual
semantical notions to the semantics of classical logic:
Definition 4.11.
(1) α⇒ β is called valid iff for every interpreted networkN: N |= α⇒ β .
(2) Let KB ⊆ L⇒ (KB is a conditional knowledge base).
We say that N |= KB iff for every ϕ⇒ψ ∈ KB it holds that N |= ϕ⇒ψ .
(3) Let KB ⊆ L⇒, let α⇒ β ∈L⇒.
We say that
KB |= α⇒ β
(KB implies α⇒ β) iff for everyN:
if N |= KB, then N |= α⇒ β .
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We loosely refer to the notions defined in this section by the term ‘net semantics’ (or
more precisely: ‘net semantics for FHINs’).
Example 4.12. Let I1 be as defined above, L1 is built from the propositional variables
b (“bird”), f (“flyer”), w (“wings”), p (“penguin”), and I1(b) = {bias, n1}, I1(f ) =
{bias, n1, n2}, I1(w) = {bias, n1, n3}, I1(p) = {bias, n1, n4}, I1(¬ϕ) := {bias} ∪ N1 \
I1(ϕ), I1(ϕ ∧ ψ) := I1(ϕ) ∪ I1(ψ) for all ϕ, ψ ∈ L1. It is easy to see that I1 is an
interpretation mapping and thus N1 = 〈I1,L1,I1〉 is an interpreted network.
The definitions of Bel and AllBel, e.g., entail that
Bel(N1, {bias, n1}, b), Bel(N1, {bias, n1}, b ∨ p),
Bel(N1, {bias, n1, n2, n3}, b), Bel(N1, {bias, n1, n2, n3}, f ∧w),
Bel(N1, {bias, n1, n4}, b ∧ p ∧w), Bel(N1, {bias, n1, n3, n4},¬f ∧w),
but also
¬Bel(N1, {bias}, b), ¬Bel(N1, {bias, n1}, f ),
¬Bel(N1, {bias, n1, n2, n3},p), ¬Bel(N1, {bias, n1, n4}, f );
AllBel(N1, {bias, n1}, b), AllBel(N1, {bias, n1}, b ∨ p),
AllBel(N1, {bias, n1, n2, n3}, f ∧w), AllBel(N1, {bias, n1, n4},p),
AllBel(N1, {bias, n1, n4}, b ∧ p), and
¬AllBel(N1, {bias}, b), ¬AllBel(N1, {bias, n1, n2, n3}, b),
¬AllBel(N1, {bias, n1, n4}, b ∧ p ∧w).
From the definition of |= it follows that
N1 |= {b⇒ f ∧w,b ∧ f ⇒w,b ∧ p⇒¬f ∧w,b⇒¬p,b ∨ p⇒ f, . . .},
N1 |= {b⇒ p,p⇒ f,f ⇒ p,⇒ b,⇒ f ∧w,
p⇒¬p,w⇒ p,b ∧ p⇒ f, . . .}.
Thus, e.g., if all thatN1 initially believes is b (see Fig. 4), thenN1 finally believes f ∧w
(see Fig. 5). Moreover, if all that N1 initially believes is b∧p (see Fig. 6), thenN1 finally
believes ¬f ∧w (see Fig. 7).
Now suppose we extended E1 by 〈bias, n1〉: then it would also follow that N1 |= {⇒
b,⇒ f ∧w, . . .}, i.e., if all that I1 believed was that “there is something”, i.e., if it had
no information at all, it would automatically infer “there is a bird, which is able to fly and
has got wings”, which might be plausible if, e.g., I1 were itself a bird living in a cage only
Fig. 4. AllBel(N1, {bias, n1}, b). Fig. 5. Bel(N1, {bias, n1, n2, n3}, f ∧w).
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Fig. 6. AllBel(N1, {bias, n1, n4}, b∧ p). Fig. 7. Bel(N1, {bias, n1, n3, n4},¬f ∧w).
populated by other (normal) birds. Thus, on the cognitive level, the role of the bias node is
to enable plausible nonmonotonic inferences from zero beliefs.
There is a variety of further interesting connectives and notions, which may be defined
in order to describe the cognitive properties of interpreted nets. However, for the rest of the
paper we will restrict ourselves only to the study of the defeasible conditional ⇒ and of
the notion of implication defined for sets of such conditionals. We postpone the study of
other connectives and further useful semantical or cognitive concepts to another paper.
5. The representation theorem
5.1. The soundness lemma
In this section we will have a look at what the correct rules of inference are for ⇒. Such
rules will be closure properties of the following prototypical form: if a conditional so and
so is true in an interpreted net, and furthermore a conditional so and so is true in the same
net, then also the conditional so and so is true in this net. The closure properties satisfied
by our nets will be proven to be those of the system CL of cumulative reasoning with Loop
(see KLM [14, pp. 186–189]). The system CL is summarized in Appendix A, where also
the notion of a conditional theory and all other notions are introduced which will be applied
in this section. A conditional theory is a set of conditionals
(i) which is closed under the rules of CL,
(ii) such that a given classical theory T H is extended by the conditional theory.
For example, if α→ β is contained in T H, then α⇒ β is contained in every conditional
theory extending T H. Intuitively, T H contains the “hard” laws, like, e.g., ‘(All) penguins
are birds’ as opposed to the “soft” laws like ‘Birds can normally fly’. CL is shown by KLM
to have a nice normal-states semantics by which a model makes a conditional α⇒ β true
iff the most normal states satisfying α also satisfy β . We will prove that CL also has a net
semantics.
For the proof of the soundness result we need another lemma first:
Lemma 5.1. Let N= 〈I,L,I〉 be an interpreted network, I = 〈N,E, I,bias〉:
if N |= α⇒ β then Cl(I(α))= Cl(I(α ∧ β)).
Proof. Since I(β)⊆ Cl(I(α)) by assumption (recall Remark 7) and I(α)⊆ Cl(I(α)) by
Remark 4, we have I(α) ⊆ I(α) ∪ I(β)= I(α ∧ β)⊆ Cl(I(α)), and thus by Lemma 3.6
Cl(I(α))= Cl(I(α ∧ β)). ✷
H. Leitgeb / Artificial Intelligence 128 (2001) 161–201 185
Lemma 5.2 (Soundness I). Let N= 〈I,L,I〉 be an interpreted network: then T H⇒(N)
is a consistent conditional theory extending T HI.
Proof. Let I = 〈N,E, I,bias〉 be an FHIN andN= 〈I,L,I〉 be an interpreted network.
Let 〈N0, . . . ,Nk〉 be the canonical partition of I:
(1) Reflexivity: N |= α⇒ α.
Since I(α)⊆ Cl(I(α)) by Remark 4.
(2) Left Logical Equivalence: If T H ! α↔ β , N |= α⇒ γ , thenN |= β⇒ γ .
Since in this case I(α) = I(β) by Corollary 4.2 and thus I(γ ) ⊆ Cl(I(α)) =
Cl(I(β)).
(3) Right Weakening: If T H ! α→ β , N |= γ ⇒ α, then N |= γ ⇒ β .
Since by assumption it holds that I(α)⊇ I(β) according to postulate (2) for I and
therefore I(β)⊆ I(α)⊆ Cl(I(γ )).
(4) Cautious Cut: If N |= α ∧ β⇒ γ , N |= α⇒ β , then N |= α⇒ γ .
Because we know from Lemma 5.1 that by assumption Cl(I(α)) = Cl(I(α ∧ β)).
But also by assumption it holds that I(γ )⊆ Cl(I(α ∧ β)) and we are done.
(5) Cautious Monotonicity: If N |= α⇒ β , N |= α⇒ γ , thenN |= α ∧ β⇒ γ .
For again by assumption and by Lemma 5.1 we have that Cl(I(α))= Cl(I(α ∧β));
but by assumption we also know that I(γ )⊆ Cl(I(α)), and we are done again.
(6) Loop: Suppose that N |= αi ⇒ αi+1 for i = 0, . . . , j (again addition is understood
modulo j + 1); in this case we have
I(α1)⊆ Cl(I(α0)), I(α2)⊆ Cl(I(α1)), . . . , I(αj )⊆ Cl(I(αj−1)),
and I(α0)⊆ Cl(I(αj )). By Lemma 3.7 it follows that Cl(I(α0))= · · · = Cl(I(αj ))
and thus by Remark 4, I(αr ′)⊆ Cl(I(αr ′))= Cl(I(αr )).
T H⇒(N) is consistent, since Cl(I()) = Cl({bias})  Cl(N) = Cl(I(⊥)) by Defini-
tion 4.1. ✷
Lemma 5.3. Let I = 〈N,E, I,bias〉 be an FHIN and let N= 〈I,L,I〉 be an interpreted
network:
(1) If I = ∅, then T H⇒(N) is closed under the rules of Monotonicity, Transitivity and
the “Easy Half of the Deduction Theorem”, i.e.,
α⇒ (β→ γ )
α ∧ β⇒ γ (EHD).
(2) If I = ∅, then T H⇒(N) is not necessarily closed under Monotonicity, Transitivity
and EHD.
Proof. By Remark 4, Monotonicity holds for ⇒ if I = ∅. On the other hand, if I = ∅
Monotonicity is obviously no longer necessarily the case. See KLM [14, p. 180] for
the proof that Monotonicity is equivalent to transitivity and EHD in the presence of the
axioms/rules of C = [CL without Loop]. ✷
Remark 8. Thus for FHINs without inhibition the system CM = [CL+Monotonicity]
(see KLM [14, pp. 200–201]) is sound, and it may even easily be seen to be complete by
applying Lemma 5.6.
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The next lemma says that the theories defined by inhibition nets are not sound relative
to the well-known system P of preferential reasoning, which is stronger than CL:
Lemma 5.4. T H⇒(N) is not necessarily closed under
α⇒ γ, β⇒ γ
α ∨ β⇒ γ (Or).
Proof. As a counterexample consider N = {bias, n1, n2, n3} such that E = {〈n1, n3〉,
〈n2, n3〉}, I = ∅; then {n3} ⊆ Cl({n1}), {n3} ⊆ Cl({n2}), but {n3}  Cl({n1} ∩ {n2}) =
Cl(∅). Add a corresponding interpretation. ✷
Lemma 5.5. T H⇒(N) is not necessarily closed under Contraposition.
Proof. Consider N = {bias, n1, n2} such that E = {〈n1, n2〉}, I = ∅; in this case
{bias, n1, n2} ⊆ Cl({bias, n1}), but N \ {n1} = {bias, n2} Cl(N \ {n1, n2})= Cl({bias}).
Again add a corresponding interpretation. ✷
The trivial counterexamples to Or and Contraposition show that the invalidness of
the latter rules has nothing to do with the presence of inhibition but that it is rather a
consequence of the definition of the net semantics as such. It is also easy to see that the
Rational Monotonicity rule is not generally satisfied by interpreted nets.
5.2. The Completeness Lemma
Now we prove a result (roughly) analogous to a version of the completeness theorem for
classical logic which states that every consistent theory has a model:
Lemma 5.6 (Completeness I). Let T H⊆ L be a theory, i.e., deductively closed:
for every consistent conditional theory T H⇒ ⊆ L⇒ extending T H there is an interpreted
network N= 〈I,L,I〉 such that
• T HI ⊇ T H, and
• T H⇒ = T H⇒(N), i.e., for every α⇒ β ∈ L⇒:
α⇒ β ∈ T H⇒ iff N |= α⇒ β.
Proof. By Theorem A.7 stated in Appendix A (and proven by KLM [14, pp. 188–189])
for every T H⇒ as above there is a finite cumulative-ordered model M = 〈S¯, l,≺〉 such
that α⇒ β ∈ T H⇒ iffM |= α⇒ β , i.e., all states minimal with respect to ≺, which make
α true, also make β true. In the following we use M to construct the intended interpreted
networkN. We use ‘s¯’ with or without index to range over states in the sense of cumulative-
ordered models, and ‘s’ as usual to range over net states.
Let N = {bias} ∪ S¯ . Let E = {〈bias, s¯〉 | s¯ is not minimal according to ≺} ∪ {〈s¯, s¯′〉 |
s¯ ≺ s¯′}. For every s¯ ∈ S¯ let Ls¯ = {s¯′ ∈ S¯ | s¯′ ≺ s¯}; say, Ls¯ = {s¯1, . . . , s¯rs }. Now we define
Is¯ = {〈bias, 〈s¯1, s¯〉〉, 〈s¯1, 〈s¯2, s¯〉〉, . . . , 〈s¯rs−1, 〈s¯rs , s¯〉〉, 〈s¯rs , 〈bias, s¯〉〉}. If s¯ is minimal in ≺,
then let Is¯ = ∅. Let I =⋃s¯∈S¯ Is¯ . Obviously, I ⊆ N ×E. Since I = 〈N,E, I,bias〉 does
not contain any cycles, and since I is finite (because S¯ is), I is an FHIN.
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We define for ϕ ∈ L: I(ϕ)= {s¯ | s¯ does not make ϕ true}. Obviously, I is an interpreta-
tion mapping. LetN= 〈I,L,I〉. N is an interpreted network.
Now we show that M |= α⇒ β iff N |= α⇒ β , which immediately entails: α⇒ β ∈
T H⇒ iff N |= α⇒ β .
Let α ∈ L. We will prove by induction that s¯ ∈ S¯ does not fire in the net state Cl(I(α))
iff s¯ is a minimal α-state according toM. Let 〈N0, . . . ,Nk〉 be the canonical partition of I
as usual.
• Induction basis: Let s¯ ∈N0 (s¯ = bias since s¯ ∈ S¯).
Cl(I(α))(s¯)= 0 iff s¯ /∈ I(α) iff s¯ is an α-state. Moreover, every state s¯ in N0 is minimal
according to ≺ by definition of E and I .
• Induction step: Assume that for every s¯ ∈ N0 ∪ · · · ∪ Ni : Cl(I(α))(s¯) = 0 iff s¯ is a
minimal α-state. Now consider an arbitrary s¯ ∈Ni+1:
Cl(I(α))(s¯)= 0 iff s¯ /∈ I(α) and ¬∃m ∈Nj with j < i such that
(Cl(I(α))(m)= 1,mE s¯,¬∃m′ ∈Nu with u < i(Cl(I(α))(m′)= 1,m′ I 〈m, s¯〉)). But this
is the case if and only if s¯ is a minimal α-state, for the following reasons:
first, s¯ /∈ I(α) iff s¯ is an α-state; at second, by definition of E and I , ¬∃m ∈Nj such that
j < i and Cl(I(α))(m)= 1,m E s¯,¬∃m′ ∈Nu with u < i such that
(Cl(I(α))(m′)= 1,m′ I 〈m, s¯〉) iff
∀s¯′ ∈Ls¯ it holds that Cl(I(α))(s¯′)= 1 iff
(by induction hypothesis) ∀s¯′ ∈ Ls¯ it holds that s¯′ is no minimal α-state. But s¯ is an α-
state and ∀s¯′ ∈ Ls¯ (s¯′ is no minimal α-state) iff s¯ is a minimal α-state (by the Smoothness
Condition). Therefore, we have that Cl(I(α))(s¯)= 0 iff s¯ is a minimal α-state.
We know thatM |= α⇒ β iff all minimal α-states are β-states. But the latter is the case,
if and only if for all s¯ ∈ S¯: if Cl(I(α))(s¯)= 0 then s¯ /∈ I(β), or equivalently, for all s¯ ∈ S¯:
if s¯ ∈ I(β) then Cl(I(α))(s¯)= 1. So,M |= α⇒ β iff N |= α⇒ β . ✷
If we take soundness and completeness together we get the following representation
theorem:
Theorem 5.7 (Representation). Let T H ⊆ L be a theory: T H⇒ ⊆ L⇒ is a consistent
conditional theory extending T H iff there is an interpreted network N = 〈I,L,I〉 such
that T HI ⊇ T H, and T H⇒ = T H⇒(N).
Proof. Lemma 5.2 proves the direction from the right to the left, Lemma 5.6 proves the
direction from the left to the right. ✷
Apart from the versions of soundness/completeness given above there are several useful
reformulations and consequences:
Corollary 5.8. Let T H⊆ L be a theory, α⇒ β ∈ L⇒, KB⊆ L⇒:
(1) α⇒ β is true in all interpreted networks such that T HI ⊇ T H iff for all consistent
conditional theories T H⇒ extending T H: α⇒ β ∈ T H⇒.
(2) α⇒ β is valid iff for all consistent conditional theories T H⇒ extending the ded.
closure dc({}) of {}: α⇒ β ∈ T H⇒.
188 H. Leitgeb / Artificial Intelligence 128 (2001) 161–201
(3) (Soundness/Completeness II)
α⇒ β is valid iff α⇒ β is provable (rel. to dc({})).
(4) KB |= α⇒ β iff for all consistent conditional theories T H⇒ ⊇ KB such that T H⇒
extends dc({}): α⇒ β ∈ T H⇒.
(5) (Soundness/Completeness III)
KB |= α⇒ β iff KB !dc({}) α⇒ β.
Proof.
(1) Apply Theorem 5.7.
(2) Apply Theorem 5.7 to (1) in Definition 4.11.
(3) Use (2) from above.
(4) Apply Theorem 5.7 to (3) in Definition 4.11.
(5) (→) Assume that KB |= α⇒ β , and for reductio suppose that there is no derivation
of α⇒ β from KB in CL. Now let T H⇒ =Deddc({})(KB). T H⇒ is a conditional
theory, T H⇒ ⊇ KB and T H⇒ is consistent by Remark A.2. By Theorem 5.7 there
is an interpreted network N such that T H⇒ = T H⇒(N). But then N |= KB and
N |= α⇒ β contradicting KB |= α⇒ β .
(←) Assume that there is a derivation of α⇒ β from KB in CL; if KB is inconsistent
then the left-hand side follows trivially. Otherwise if for some arbitrary interpreted
network N we have N |= KB, then T H⇒(N)⊇ KB, and T H⇒(N) is a consistent
conditional theory by Theorem 5.7; thus Deddc({})(T H⇒(N)) = T H⇒(N). But
then α⇒ β ∈ T H⇒(N), and thereforeN |= α⇒ β . ✷
6. Inhibition nets and other forms of nonmonotonic reasoning
There are various connections between inhibition nets and other mechanisms of
nonmonotonic reasoning. We will again restrict ourselves to finite, hierarchical inhibition
nets.
Let us begin with logic programs. In Appendix B one can find the basic definitions
and standard results for the blossoming field of logic programming, as far as we need
them in this section. By means of the following two definitions we will show how to
associate finite hierarchical inhibition nets with logic programs of a certain important type,
and vice versa. First of all, given an FHIN we can construct a “counterpart program” in
which excitatory connections are simulated by rules with positive bodies, and in which
inhibitory connections are replaced by negation as failure. Input states will be transformed
into bodyless rules:
Definition 6.1. Let I = 〈N,E, I,bias〉 be an FHIN:
the program Π(I) associated with I is defined in the following way:
(1) use N as the set P of propositional variables (but if there is no edge from bias to
some other node or edge, simply drop bias);
(2) for each n ∈N add all rules of the form n← n′,not n1, . . . ,not nj , where
• n′ E n,
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• for all i with 1 i  j : ni I 〈n′, n〉,
• for all n′′ ∈N : if n′′ I 〈n′, n〉 then ∃i with 1 i  j such that n′′ = ni .
(3) do not add any further rules.
Let s∗ ∈ S; the program Π(I, s∗) associated with the net I and the input s∗ is defined
as follows:
(1) use N as the set P of propositional variables (but, again, if there is no edge from
bias to some other node or edge drop bias);
(2) add all rules contained in Π(I);
(3) add all bodyless rules with head n iff s∗(n)= 1;
(4) do not add any further rules.
The next definition shows how to simulate any given finite, normal, hierarchical logic
program by means of an inhibition net in which conjunction nodes replace the positive
parts of rule bodies, and in which inhibition lines replace negation as failure. Recall from
Theorem 3.8 that we can always construct a conjunction node n1 ∧ · · · ∧ ni of nodes
n1, . . . , ni (if i = 1 then we regard n1 as a “conjunction” node); for the construction we
have to add a subnet of auxiliary inter-nodes. The input associated with a program will be
set to the class of heads of its bodyless rules:
Definition 6.2. Let Π be a finite, normal, and hierarchical program (allowing for negation
as failure) based on a set P of propositional variables:
the inhibition net I(Π)= 〈NΠ,EΠ, IΠ,biasΠ 〉 associated with Π is given as follows:
(1) NΠ = P ∪ {biasΠ }∪ the set of auxiliary nodes needed for the construction of
conjunction nodes; biasΠ is some object not contained in P ,
(2) for all n,n1, . . . , ni+j ∈ N : (n1 ∧ · · · ∧ ni) EΠ n iff there is a rule n ←
n1, . . . , ni ,not ni+1, . . . ,not ni+j in Π ,
(3) for all n,n′, n1, . . . , ni , ni+2, . . . , ni+j ∈ N : n′ I 〈(n1 ∧ · · · ∧ ni), n〉 iff there is a
rule n← n1, n2, . . . , ni, not n′,not ni+2, . . . ,not ni+j in Π .
The input s∗(Π) associated with Π is defined as {biasΠ } joined with the set of all
propositional variables n such that n is contained in Π as a bodyless rule.
Note that I(Π) has more nodes than Π has propositional variables.
The following theorem proves the two definitions above to be sound and compatible:
Theorem 6.3. Let I = 〈N,E, I,bias〉 be an FHIN, s∗ ∈ S, Π be a finite, normal,
hierarchical program:
(1) Π(I) and Π(I, s∗) are finite, normal, hierarchical programs.
(2) I(Π) is an FHIN, s∗(Π) is a state of I(Π).
(3) Cn(Π(I, s∗))= ClI(s∗).
(4) ClI(Π)(s∗(Π)) \ [{biasΠ } ∪ the set of auxiliary nodes] = Cn(Π).
Proof.
(1) Directly by Definition 6.1; use Lemma 2.6.
(2) Directly by Definition 6.2 and Definition B.9 of being hierarchical.
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The other claims follow from Definitions 6.1 and 6.2, and Definition B.6 of answer sets.
By Proposition B.12 answer sets are identical to stable states in the case of finite, normal,
hierarchical programs. ✷
Claims (3) and (4) capture what we mean when we say that finite, normal, hierarchical
logic programs and FHINs are equivalent concerning their dynamics. An analogous
theorem may be stated for finite normal hierarchical basic programs and inhibition nets
without inhibitory connections.
By Theorem 6.3 logic programs (e.g., implemented as Prolog programs) may be used
to generate the closures of input states of FHINs. Furthermore, all of the notions and
results on inhibition nets presented above may be applied to finite, normal, and hierarchical
logic programs, and also vice versa. For example, it is well known that answer sets for
finite normal programs are minimal models of the translation of the programs into the
language of classical logic, and that the classical interpretations which are closed under
and supported by a logic program are precisely those interpretations which satisfy the
completion of the program (see Lifschitz [16, pp. 106–107]), and so forth. These results
are now also applicable to inhibition nets.
In analogy to (partially) interpreted inhibition nets we can also speak of a (partially)
interpreted finite, normal, and hierarchical logic program, which may be defined in the
manner of Definition 4.1. By Theorem 6.3 also interpreted logic programs and interpreted
inhibition nets are intertranslatable, where we use the interpretation mapping of the given
interpreted program or network as the interpretation mapping of the intended translation of
the given interpreted program or network. But note that the transition from an interpreted
logic program to an interpreted inhibition net in the way of Definition 6.2 will actually
result in a partially interpreted inhibition net, since the nodes which have to be added in
order to get a corresponding inhibition net are actually not contained within the images of
the interpretation mapping of the given interpreted logic program.
Inhibition nets may also be considered as default theories (Reiter [24]) of a certain
restricted kind. Here we can again apply a result for logic programs: see the end of
Appendix B for a translation of logic programs into default theories. Using Theorem 6.1
we can thus also translate inhibition nets into default theories. By Proposition B.13 the
deductive closures of answer sets are identical to the extensions of the translated logic
programs. By Theorem 6.3 this also holds for the closures of the translated inhibition nets
with an input. The well known translations from default logic to autoepistemic logic (e.g.,
Konolige [13]) are therefore as well applicable to inhibition nets. Moreover, Marek and
Truszczyn´ski [19, pp. 374–376], directly translate logic programs into sets of formulas of
autoepistemic logic, and also this result may be used to translate inhibition net reasoning
into autoepistemic reasoning.
Similar to the transformation of inhibition nets into logic programs and vice versa, we
can also mutually translate inhibition nets into truth maintenance systems (Doyle [6])
presented in a more abstract setting as nonmonotonic formal systems (Brewka [4, pp.
125–143]) or nonmonotonic rule systems (Marek and Truszczyn´ski [19, pp. 376–380]).
The rules of such systems have the prototypical form ‘IF a1, . . . , an UNLESS b1, . . . , bn
THEN c’ analogous to the normal rules in logic programs.
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Various other nonmonotonic reasoning mechanisms do not seem to have to do much with
inhibition nets, although they are also based on directed acyclic graphs: e.g., inheritance
nets, which lack inhibition, while inhibition nets lack negative paths.
After pointing out the similarities between inhibition nets and some kinds of non-
monotonic reasoning mechanisms we should now turn to the differences. A superficial
difference is that we have partially employed abstract imitations of the concepts used
in dynamical systems theory and connectionism, where nonmonotonic reasoning usually
presupposes the language and the concepts of classical AI. But the essential distinction
between interpreted nets and the other approaches lies on the interpretative level, i.e., on
the level where some kind of meaning is assigned to entities like nodes, or to the processes
acting upon these entities. The main idea used in logic programming, default reasoning,
and truth maintenance systems is
(i) to assign meaning to the very entities (nodes ≈ propositional variables) which are
used as the constituents of the local rules governing the nonmonotonic inference
process, and
(ii) to assign meaning to the local rules themselves in some way.
For example, we might implement a logic program using the propositional variables b,
p, f and the single rule f ← b,not p. The entities having representational function are
the propositional variables b, p, f standing for birds, penguins, and flyers respectively,
and the local rule f ← b,not p by which birds are believed to be flyers as long as they
are not believed to be penguins. The propositional variables which are subject to this local
rule are thus also interpreted. On the other hand this is not true for interpreted inhibition
nets: while the entities which represent are the patterns of activity, the entities subject to
local activation rules are the nodes in a network. Edges are not interpreted at all in the
case of inhibition nets, and generally it will even be impossible to read any content into a
single connection. Finally, note that in logic programs propositional variables are used as
nodes, whereas in interpreted networks propositional variables are interpreted as sets of
nodes.
Furthermore, all of the approaches cited in this section belong to the family of
consistency-/fixed point based systems of nonmonotonic reasoning as opposed to the
preference-based systems (for more on this vague but useful distinction see, e.g., Brewka et
al. [5]). The former family shares a reluctance to cumulativity, which the latter is inclined
to. In some way interpreted inhibition nets seem to bridge the gap between the two rivalling
families: on the local level, i.e., on the level of nodes and edges, they are quite similar
to the consistency-based approaches to nonmonotonic reasoning as the translations from
above show us. But on the global level of patterns and beliefs ascriptions they behave like
preference-based systems as it has been proven by the representation theorem of the last
section (other bridges between the two families have been drawn, e.g., by Brewka [3]).
7. Inhibition nets and artificial neural networks
An artificial neural network (ANN) with a distinguished external input may be
considered as a tuple 〈U,W,A,O,NET, ex〉 having the following properties (this is the
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definition stated by Nauck et al. [21, pp. 19–24], where also a general overview of ANNs
is to be found):
(1) U is a finite and nonempty set of units.
(2) W :U × U → R is the pattern of (weight-) connectivity, which assigns a weight to
each edge between units.
(3) A is a function which maps each unit u ∈ U to an activation mapping Au :R3 →R
such that the activation state au(t+1) of u at time t+1 is dependent on the previous
activation state au(t) of u, the current net input netu(t + 1) of u, and the (constant)
external input ex(u) fed into u, i.e.,
au(t + 1)=Au(au(t),netu(t + 1), ex(u)).
(4) O is a function which maps each unit u ∈ U to an output mapping Ou :R→R such
that the output state ou(t +1) of u at time t +1 is solely dependent on the activation
state au(t + 1) of u, i.e., ou(t + 1)=Ou(au(t + 1)).
(5) NET is a function mapping every unit u ∈ U to a net input (or propagation) mapping
NETu : (R×R)U →R such that the net input netu(t + 1) of u at time t + 1 depends
on the weights of the edges leading from units u′ to u, and on the previous output
states of the units u′, i.e., netu(t + 1)= NETu(λu′.〈W(u′, u), ou(t)〉).
(6) ex :U →R is the external input function, which we assume to be constant.
Often,
(i) W is defined the way that the set of edges having nonzero weight corresponds to
a directed acyclic graph, and
(ii) Au only depends on the net input and/or the external input, i.e., Au :R2 →R such
that au(t + 1)=Au(netu(t + 1), ex(u)).
If an ANN satisfies (i) we call it ‘layered’, if it satisfies (ii) we call it ‘input-driven’. Let
us furthermore call an ANN ‘binary’, if for every u ∈U : Ou is a mapping from R to {0,1},
ex(u) ∈ {0,1}, and if ex(u)= 1 then also ou(t + 1)= 1 (for t  0).
An ANN is a dynamical system transforming an initial network state under the influence
of the external input. We only consider ANNs defined on a discrete time scale. Moreover,
we assume the initial state of an ANN to be given by the output states ou(0) for arbitrary
u ∈ U . More usually, the initial net state is given by the activity states au(0), but for our
purposes the output states are more adequate.
Now we will show correspondence results for a class of ANNs and the class of FHINs.
We avoid stating the formal details of how to explicitly construct an FHIN from a given
ANN, and vice versa, since the technicalities are rather awkward. Instead, we will only
sketch the constructions:
Theorem 7.1. Every binary, layered, and input-driven ANN may be simulated by an FHIN,
such that every output state ou of the ANN corresponds to a state s of the FHIN, every
external input ex to the ANN is translated to an input state s∗ of the FHIN, and the closure
of ex (which may be defined analogously to the definition for FHINs) is translated to the
closure of s∗.
Proof. All units of the given ANN are also used as nodes in the FHIN to be constructed.
The only observation we need for the construction is that
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(i) if the external input to a unit in the ANN is 1, its output state is also set to 1, and
(ii) if the external input to a unit in the ANN is 0, the output state of the unit is the
image of a Boolean mapping the arguments of which are the outputs states of other
units.
This is the case because we have presupposed the ANN to be binary. By Theorem 3.8
we may thus replace the weighted edges leading to an arbitrary unit u ∈ U by an inhibition
subnetwork computing the very Boolean mapping that is associated with u in the case of
lacking external input. In order to do so we may have to add nodes, but this does not matter.
Since the given ANN is supposed to be layered, the resulting inhibition net is hierarchical,
and thus an FHIN. The external input function corresponds to an input state, the initial
output state to an initial state in the FHIN. Therefore the given ANN and its associate
FHIN have the same closure of the input. In general, the so-constructed FHIN has more
nodes than the given ANN. ✷
By Theorem 7.1 every result on inhibition nets in Sections 2 and 3 is applicable to binary,
layered, and input-driven ANNs. Now for the other direction:
Theorem 7.2. Every FHIN may be simulated by a binary, layered, and input-driven ANN,
such that every state s of the FHIN corresponds to an output state ou of the ANN, every
input state s∗ of the FHIN is translated to an external input ex to the ANN, and the closure
of s∗ is translated to the closure of ex.
Proof. All nodes of the given FHIN are also used as units in the ANN to be constructed.
The inhibition of edges employed in inhibition nets may be simulated by the inhibition
of inter-nodes in ANNs: for each inhibitory line 〈n1, 〈n2, n3〉〉 in the given FHIN add a
further inter-node n in the ANN, replace 〈n1, 〈n2, n3〉〉 by the inhibitory line 〈n1, n〉 having
the negative weigth −1, while simultaneously replacing the excitatory connection 〈n2, n3〉
in the FHIN by two excitatory lines 〈n2, n〉 and 〈n,n3〉 both having positive weight 1.
All other excitatory connections in the FHIN are replaced by connections with positive
weight 1. For each unit we choose weighted summation as the net input mapping, the
external input is identified with the (arbitrarily) given input state, and we set the activation
mapping of each unit to a threshold function such that the activation state of the unit is 1,
if the external input to the unit is 1 or the net input of the unit is larger than 0. For every
unit we define the output mapping to be the identity function. Since the states of nodes in
an FHIN are binary, and since FHINs are hierarchical, we get a binary, layered, and input-
driven ANN having the same closure of the input state as the given FHIN. The resulting
ANN has generally more nodes than the FHIN. ✷
Theorems 7.1 and 7.2 state that FHINs and binary, layered, input-driven ANNs are
indistinguishable concerning their dynamics. In analogy to (partially) interpreted inhibition
nets we can speak of a (partially) interpreted binary, layered, and input-driven ANN, which
may be defined in the way of Definition 4.1. By Theorems 7.1 and 7.2 also interpreted
ANNs and interpreted inhibition nets are intertranslatable, by using the interpretation
mapping of the given network as the interpretation mapping of the translation of the given
network. But as the proof of Theorem 7.1 shows, the translation of an interpreted ANN
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into an interpreted inhibition net will generally result in a partially interpreted inhibition
net, since the set of nodes may have to be enlarged. The same holds for the transition into
the opposite direction (according to the proof of Theorem 7.2).
Every interpreted ANN with the properties from above again satisfies a conditional
theory, and for every consistent conditional theory there is an interpreted ANN with such
properties, which satisfies the theory. For this reason we may call CL sound and complete
with respect to a net semantics for artificial neural networks of an important kind. If the
weights of the edges of an interpreted ANN are altered by means of a learning mechanism,
also the corresponding conditional theory is altered. In this way an interpreted ANN might
learn a conditional theory, i.e., a set of conditional beliefs might be acquired by the
network. The conditional beliefs of an interpreted ANN are represented by the weights
of its connections.
The results of Sections 6 and 7 also show that finite, normal, hierarchical logic programs
and binary, layered, input-driven ANNs are intertranslatable, as far as their closure
dynamics is concerned.
8. Conclusions
It has been shown that the inferences that interpreted nets are disposed to draw may be
described by theories of defeasible conditionals, where the very theories are closed under
the rules of the system CL. Moreover, for every consistent theory of this kind there is
an interpreted net having precisely the inferential dispositions stated by the theory. We
suppose that these results may have consequences both for connectionist approaches to
cognition and for the more classical AI approaches to nonmonotonic reasoning.
A first consequence of our results is that Smolensky’s subsymbolic hypothesis on the
connectionist paradigm seems to stand on shaky ground: if the subconceptual connectionist
dynamical system is identical to an interpreted net, the hypothesis is provably false,
as our results show. Of course, this failure may be due to the simplicity of inhibition
nets compared to the complexity of real biological structures or to more elaborate
artificial neural networks. But the contributions of Gärdenfors and Balkenius cited above
and also the results of Section 7 seem to indicate that the subsymbolic hypothesis
is as well questionable for the latter networks. Furthermore, Smolensky [30, p. 18]
writes: “Formalizing knowledge in soft constraints rather than hard rules has important
consequences. Hard constraints have consequences singly; they are rules that can be
applied separately and sequentially—the operation of each proceeding independently of
whatever other rules may exist. But soft constraints have no implications singly; any one
can be overridden by the others. It is only the entire set of soft constraints that has any
implications. Inference must be a cooperative process [. . .]. Furthermore, adding additional
soft constraints can repeal conclusions that were formerly valid: Subsymbolic inference
is fundamentally nonmonotonic.” We agree with Gärdenfors [8, p. 69] that Smolensky
is mistaken in speaking of ‘inferences’ on the subsymbolic level, since inferences are
activities on the symbolic level. As far as interpreted nets are concerned this is indicated
by the fact that the above quote comes out true if the talk of ‘soft constraints’ is replaced
by the talk of ‘defeasible conditionals’ with the truth conditions stated in Definition 4.9.
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Our results leave us with the opportunity to choose between (at least) four kinds of
implementations for agents supposed to draw nonmonotonic inferences according to the
rules of CL: the first one consists in defining a symbolic knowledge base for factual
knowledge, a second one for default knowledge, and in implementing a computation
unit which derives defeasible conditionals from the conditionals stored in the second
knowledge base by means of CL. If the antecedent of such a derived conditional
matches the conjunction of all the current entries in the factual knowledge base, the
corresponding consequent may be inferred by default. The second kind of implementation
consists in the construction of a finite hierarchical inhibition net. Factual knowledge is
represented by activation patterns, which may be considered as the translations of symbolic
representations by means of an interpretation mapping. The conclusions which are drawn
are represented by closure states, which may be retranslated into factual formulas. The
topology of the network may be described by a conditional theory, and a network might
even be constructed according to a given conditional theory by applying Theorem 5.6.
The third kind of implementation is by certain logic programs, the fourth one by certain
artificial neural networks.
Either way that we implement such an agent, it is guaranteed that the agent is disposed
to draw inferences which are closed under the laws of the system CL.
But this does not imply that the various kinds of implementations are exchangeable in
every respect: e.g., an agent which uses a symbolic knowledge base is able to integrate a
new conditional belief by simply adding another defeasible conditional to its knowledge
base. In order to reach the same result a net agent may perhaps be forced to readjust the
topology of the whole network. On the other hand, if the net agent has found a net topology
subserving his inferential needs, it will perhaps be quicker in actually drawing inferences,
although such questions of complexity have to be investigated separately in detail. A further
advantage a symbolic agent has is that it is able to unfold the assumptions on which its
inferences have been based, and how they have been derived. A net agent can only tell us
about the trajectory of states which have led to his conclusions. Put shortly: each kind of
implementation seems to have its shortcomings and virtues. The most important aspect of
the investigations above is perhaps that we may switch from a symbolic implementation to
a dynamic one and back if we want, and that we might also use a hybrid system consisting
of different kinds of components.
Appendix A. Conditional theories and the system CL
In this appendix we will summarize the system CL of cumulativity with loop which
has been introduced by KLM [14, pp. 187–189]. CL is stronger than the system C of
pure cumulativity but weaker than the well-known system P of preferentiality. Contrary to
KLM we develop CL in a strictly syntactical manner without making use of nonmonotonic
consequence relations |∼. As a substitute for consequence relations we will introduce
conditional theories, which are defined as sets of “soft” conditionals closed under the
rules of CL while extending a given set T H of “hard” formulas. T H⊆ L is a deductively
closed set of propositional formulas. Most notions defined in this section will only be given
relative to a theory T H. Actually, we should also relativize our notion of a conditional
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theory to the system CL in some way and rather speak of a CL-theory, but for simplicity
and because we do not use any other system than CL in this paper, we say ‘conditional
theory’ simpliciter.
Definition A.1.
(1) A conditional theory extending T H is a set T H⇒ ⊆ L⇒ with the property that for
all α ∈ L it holds that α⇒ α ∈ T H⇒ (Reflexivity), and which is closed under the
following rules:
1.
T H ! α↔ β, α⇒ γ
β⇒ γ (Left Logical Equivalence)
2.
T H ! α→ β, γ ⇒ α
γ ⇒ β (Right Weakening)
3.
α ∧ β⇒ γ, α⇒ β
α⇒ γ (Cautious Cut)
4.
α⇒ β, α⇒ γ
α ∧ β⇒ γ (Cautious Monotonicity)
5.
α0 ⇒ α1, α1 ⇒ α2, . . . , αj−1 ⇒ αj , αj ⇒ α0
αr ⇒ αr ′ (Loop)
(r, r ′ are arbitrary members of {0, . . . , j })
for all α, β , γ , α0, α1, . . . , αj ∈ L.
We refer to the axiom scheme and the rules above as the system CL. The rules
are to be read in the following way: e.g., by Cut, if α ∧ β ⇒ γ ∈ T H⇒ and
α⇒ β ∈ T H⇒, then α⇒ γ ∈ T H⇒.
(2) A conditional theory T H⇒ is consistent, if ⇒⊥ /∈ T H⇒.
Remark A.2.
• A conditional theory extending T H is also a conditional theory extending any theory
T H′ ⊆ T H.
• It is easy to see that T H⇒ is consistent iff T H⇒ is nontrivial, i.e., T H⇒ = L⇒ (use
Right Weakening and Cautious Monotonicity).
• If a conditional theory extending T H is consistent, then also T H is consistent, i.e.,
T H ⊥ (use Reflexivity and Right Weakening).
Lemma A.3 (KLM [14, pp. 179–180]). The following rules are derivable in CL (i.e., if
the premises of the following rules are in T H⇒, then also their conclusions):
1.
α⇒ β, α⇒ γ
α⇒ β ∧ γ (And)
2.
α⇒ β, β⇒ α, α⇒ γ
β⇒ γ (Equivalence)
3.
α⇒ (β→ γ ), α⇒ β
α⇒ γ (Modus Ponens in the Consequent)
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4.
α ∨ β⇒ α, α⇒ γ
α ∨ β⇒ γ
Definition A.4. Let KB⊆ L⇒:
(1) A derivation (relative to T H) of ϕ ⇒ ψ from KB is a finite sequence 〈α1 ⇒
β1, . . . , αk ⇒ βk〉, where αk = ϕ, βk = ψ , and for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k} at least one
of the following conditions is satisfied:
• αi ⇒ βi ∈ KB;
• αi ⇒ βi is an instance of Reflexivity;
• αi ⇒ βi is the conclusion of one of the rules of CL, such that the conditional
premises of the very rule are among {α1 ⇒ β1, . . . , αi−1 ⇒ βi−1}, and in the
case of Left Logical Equivalence and Right Weakening the derivability conditions
concerning T H are satisfied.
(2) KB !T H ϕ ⇒ ψ (ϕ ⇒ ψ is derivable relative to T H from KB), if there is a
derivation of ϕ⇒ψ relative to T H from KB.
(3) DedT H(KB)= {ϕ⇒ψ | KB !T H ϕ⇒ψ |} (the conditional closure of KB relative
to T H).
(4) ϕ⇒ψ is provable (relative to T H), if ∅ !T H ϕ⇒ψ .
Remark A.5.
(1) As usual, it follows that
(i) KB⊆DedT H(KB),
(ii) if KB1 ⊆ KB2 then DedT H(KB1)⊆DedT H(KB2), and
(iii) DedT H(DedT H(KB))=DedT H(KB).
(2) Obviously, T H⇒ is a conditional theory extending T H iff DedT H(T H⇒) =
T H⇒.
Since DedT H(DedT H(KB)) = DedT H(KB), DedT H(KB) is a conditional theory
extending T H for arbitrary KB. In particular, DedT H(∅) (the set of formulas
provable relative to T H) is a conditional theory extending T H.
(3) DedT H(KB) is the smallest conditional theory extending T H which contains KB.
Now we sketch the normal states semantics for CL introduced by KLM.
Let W be a set of worlds (= propositional variable assignments) for L. W is not
necessarily identical to the set of all worlds for L.
Definition A.6.
(1) A cumulative-ordered modelM is a triple 〈S¯, l,≺〉 with
(1) a nonempty set S¯ of states,
(2) a labelling l : S¯→ ℘(W) \ {∅} of states, and
(3) an irreflexive and transitive preference relation≺ ⊆ S¯× S¯ between states stating
that one state is more normal than another,
(4) such thatM satisfies the Smoothness Condition (see below).
(2) Factual formulas α are made true by states s¯ in the following way:
s¯ |≡ α iff ∀w ∈ l(s¯): w |= α. In this case we also say that s¯ is an α-state.
(3) For every α ∈ L let αˆ = {s¯ ∈ S¯ | s¯ |≡ α}.
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(4) Relative to a cumulative-ordered modelM= 〈S¯, l,≺〉 we can define:
M |= α⇒ β if the most normal states, among those which make α true, also make
β true, i.e., ∀s¯ ∈ S¯ (if s¯ is minimal in αˆ, then s¯ |≡ β).
(5) Here we use: s¯ is minimal in αˆ iff s¯ ∈ αˆ, ¬∃s¯′ ∈ αˆ: s¯′ ≺ s¯.
(6) The Smoothness Condition says that every state, which makes α true, is either
itself most normal among the states which make α true, or there is a more
normal state, which makes α true, which is also most normal; i.e., ∀α ∈ L,∀s¯ ∈ S¯
(s¯ minimal in αˆ, or ∃s¯′ ≺ s¯ (s¯′ minimal in αˆ)).
(7) Let T H⇒(M)= {α⇒ β |M |= α⇒ β}.
Note that if L has only finitely many propositional variables then a model M based on
L has only finitely many worlds.
KLM [14] show the following representation theorem (though stated in different terms):
Theorem A.7 (KLM [14, p. 189]). T H⇒ ⊆ L⇒ is a consistent conditional theory
extending T H iff there is a cumulative-ordered model M based on the set W of worlds
satisfying T H such that T H⇒ = T H⇒(M).
Remark A.8. The consistency constraint on T H⇒ seems to have been overlooked by
KLM [14].
Appendix B. Basics of logic programming
Let us briefly repeat some of the basic definitions to be found in the standard literature
on logic programming. We will use the excellent introductory article by Lifschitz [16],
where all the notions and results given below are stated. A standard textbook reference on
logic programming is Lloyd [17].
Definition B.1. Let P be a set of propositional variables (positive literals). Negative
literals are negated propositional variables. Literals are positive or negative literals. Let Lit
be the set of literals (given relative to P ). A rule element is a literal possibly preceded by the
negation-as-failure symbol not. If X is a set of literals, let not(X)= {not n | n ∈X}. X is
inconsistent, if ∃n,¬n ∈X (consistent, otherwise). X is logically closed, if it is consistent
or equal to Lit.
Definition B.2. A rule is an ordered pair Head ← Body, whose first member Head is a
literal, and whose second member Body is a (possibly empty) finite set of rule elements.
A basic rule is a rule, whose body is a set of literals. A rule can be represented as
Head ← Pos∪ not(Neg) for some finite sets of literals Pos, Neg. The rule with the head n0
and the body {n1, . . . , ni,not ni+1, . . . ,not ni+j } is often written as:
n0 ← n1, . . . , ni,not ni+1, . . . ,not ni+j .
Definition B.3. A program is a set of rules. A basic program is a set of basic rules.
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In the following ‘X’ will range over sets of literals.
Definition B.4. Let Π be a basic program.
X is closed under Π , if for every rule Head ← Body ∈Π we have that
(Body⊆X→Head ∈X).
Cn(Π) is the smallest set of literals which is both logically closed and closed under Π
(such a set always exists). The elements of Cn(Π) are called the consequences of Π .
Now we turn to programs in general and thus to negation as failure:
Definition B.5. Let Π be an arbitrary program.
The reduct of Π relative to X is the basic program obtained from Π by
• deleting each rule Head ← Pos∪ not(Neg) such that Neg∩X = ∅, and
• replacing all remaining rules Head ← Pos∪ not(Neg) by Head ← Pos.
ΠX is the resulting program.
Definition B.6. X is an answer set for a program Π , if Cn(ΠX)= X (note that ΠX is a
basic program). For Π being an arbitrary program, we define Cn(Π) as the intersection
of all answers sets for Π . For basic programs this is a conservative extension of the old
definition.
Definition B.7. X is closed under a program Π , if for every rule Head ← Pos ∪ not(Neg)
∈Π we have that (Pos⊆X,Neg∩X = ∅→Head ∈X).
Proposition B.8. Every answer set for a program Π is closed under Π .
Definition B.9. A program Π is hierarchical, if there is a level (rank) mapping rk : Lit →
Ord from literals to the class of ordinals, such that for every rule Head ← Pos ∪ not(Neg)
∈Π which is not bodyless:
rk(Head) > max
n∈Pos∪Neg rk(n).
Proposition B.10. Hierarchical programs have at most one answer set.
Definition B.11. A rule element, rule or program is normal, if it does not contain the
classical negation symbol ¬.
Proposition B.12. Normal hierarchical programs have exactly one answer set.
A rule
n0 ← n1, . . . , nk,not nk+1, . . . ,not nm
may be identified with the default
n1 ∧ · · · ∧ nk :¬nk+1, . . . ,¬nm
n0
.
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In this way programs are identified with default theories of a special syntactic form.
Let the extensions for default theories be defined as usual, and let the consequences of
default theories be defined as the members of all extensions.
Proposition B.13. For every program Π :
• if X is an answer set for Π then dc(X) is an extension for Π (after translating as
sketched above),
• every extension for Π is the deductive closure of an answer set for Π , and this answer
set is determined uniquely.
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